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SUMMARY 
This thesis is a textual analysis of the fiscal and legal aspects relating 
to the exploration and exploitation for oil and gas. The need for 
promotion of the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas and the 
fiscal and legal aspects relating thereto. The different types of legal 
agreements commonly found in transactions between the State and 
the private international investor are cited as are the implications of 
the different types of taxes levied by the State in order to collect its 
'take' in the national resource. The method of taxation of oil in South 
Africa is examined with special reference to the prospecting lease 
OP26 granted by the State to SOEKOR (Pty} Limited. 
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- CHAPTER I-
This chapter considers those matters which a country needs to 
consider in establishing its general petroleum policy. In doing so, the 
country needs to take cognisance of e.g. the countries prospectivity, 
technical competence and impact on the environment. 
1 . General Petroleum Policy 
The countries political and future goals normally form the basis 
for the choice of framework of petroleum policy. Setting these 
initial objectives is inherently difficult as one does not know the 
potential at the outset. Before any country can decide the way 
it should organise its energy sector it must establish the 
objectives of this sector. Before setting up objectives, there are 
individual premises that are present in each country that have 
to be considered. Such premises include: 
Political conditions 
Economic / legal conditions 
Administrative conditions 
Technical competence 
The internal energy situation must also be considered. This 
includes the geological prospectivity, energy balance arid 
general energy policy within the country. 
After having identified these premises, the country must set up 
certain objectives for the petroleum sector. Examples of such 
objectives are that the petroleum sector shall: 
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Contribute to State income 
Contribute to energy supply 
Contribute to increased national technical and 
administrative competence 
Concommitant considerations would include: 
Macro-economic effects 
Regional effects 
Impact of petroleum activity on environment 
There are certain mechanisms that are available to assist in 






National / State participation 
Risks associated with exploration and production can be 
significant but so too the rewards. The fiscal terms are, 
therefore, very important for maximisation of the state income 
and at the same time must ensure acceptable returns to the 
international investor. 
The fiscal terms are dependent on which contractual framework 





Ring fencing rules 
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The matter of depreciation and 'uplift' is of special importance, 
especially when it comes to offshore production where the 
investments are very high. 
Other economic factors relevant in the governmental income 
are: 
Carrying of State company in the exploration phase 
·Division between private and state oil company on profit 
oil 
Price of oil in risk contracts 
Rental Charges / Area fees 
2. Legal Framework 
A contractual framework as opposed to a legal framework 
consists of a less extensive petroleum act with more emphasis 
being placed on agreements with the government. (See 
Chapter Ill for greater detail). Under this kind of system, the 
law does not regulate the petroleum activity in detail, but 
.provides wide authorisation to enter into contracts. This 
system gives the authorities the possibility of changing both 
content and conditions to changing political objectives, without 
the need to change the petroleum act that may have been too 
inflexible to the changing circumstances. This sort of 
framework provides the petroleum industry with a flexible 
system allowing changes to be introduced easily and 
expeditiously. 
A contractual system also offers the possibility of including 
different elements in different licenses variable in time, or in 
prospectivity of the acreage, as it permits negotiation between 
the authorities and the licensees. 
An extensive legal framework on the other hand will be more 
predictable to the participants, as it assumes a more thoroughly 
regulated petroleum act, and will also be able to prevent 
arbitrariness and differential treatment. 
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3. International Participation (Investment Finance) 
Amongst other things, energy project finance is concerned with 
the development of oil and gas resources, including extraction, 
movement, refining and other forms of processing. Energy 
Project Finance is a tried and tested method of financing oil and 
gas projects in the developed world. The techniques are 
increasingly being applied in other parts of the world, such as 
Asia, Africa and, to a more limited extent, the new independent 
states of the former Soviet Union. In such countries, not only 
are the techniques unfamiliar to host governments, but the risks 
are greater. In many of these countries the legal system is 
developing, often from an unsophisticated base, and political 
risks are perceived to be higher. 
Two Critical Factors 
Countries choose to develop their oil and gas resources using 
the project techniques of the private sector, as opposed to 
developing the resources in the public sector, for two key 
reasons. 
An exploration and development programme may cost hundreds 
of millions of dollars for a discovery of any significance. Many 
countries are not able to afford such costs and may in any 
event not have the technological sophistication to conduct an 
exploration and development programme without foreign 
assistance. Thus, foreign oil companies are invited to 
participate in exploration and/or production, possibly by way of 
a joint venture with the state oil company. 
Risks associated with exploration and production can be 
significant. Countries with little or no gross national product 
may be· reluctant to gamble their limited financial reserves on a 
high risk venture. Further, some rich countries also do not 
wish to assume a high level risk. Such is the case with the UK, 
for example, which has developed a highly regulated regime to 
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protect the nation's interests while the oil companies operate at 
their own risk and expense. 
How are the factors balanced 
The host nation balances these factors by inviting foreign oil 
companies to participate. A Petroleum Exploration and 
Exploitation Agreement is entered into between the foreign oil 
compc;1_ny and the host nation. 
Three principal types of agreement are commonly used: 
Concession Agreement 
Production Sharing Agreement 
Risk Service Contract 
However, hybrids are sometimes seen. Pakistan uses a 
Production Sharing Agreement but with royalty and tax 
provisions normally thought of a being characteristic of a 
Concession Agreement. 
Conflicting Interests 
When negotiating the Exploration and Exploitation Agreement, 
the interests of the foreign oil company and the host nation can 
differ. 
The objectives of the oil company may include: 
a desire to maximise its profits; 
a desire to receive high return on its investment as 
quickly as possible; and 
a high degree of autonomy over the operation 
of the project. 
On the other hand, the aims of the host government may 
include: 
seeking to ensure a comprehensive and efficient 
exploration programme; 
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maximising profits received by the host government; 
asserting as much control as possible over operational 
activity; 
maximising the benefit to the host country, for 
example by training of local personnel; and 
' procuring irrevocable transfers of technology to boost the 
industrial base of the host country. 
4. Contractual Framework 
Each type of exploration and exploitation agreement has its 
own characteristics, advantages and disadvantages. 
1 . The Concession Agreement (also known as the Permit Licence 
or Lease) give the exclusive right to explore and develop 
petroleum and the agreed area. 
It has the advantage that the oil company will acquire rights 
which may, depending on the jurisdiction, be of a proprietary 
rather than merely of a contractual nature. This may provide 
extra protection should it ever prove necessary to .go to court 
over the Agreement 
2. It has the disadvantage that all operations will be at the sole 
risk of the Company. Payments from the oil company will 
include: 
rentals on the area -of the concessions; 
royalties (in cash or kind, often depending upon the 
election of the host government); and/or 
tax 
2. A Production Sharing Agreement differs from a Concession 
Agreement in certain ways. 
It has the disadvantage that the legal right to explore and 
exploit the oil will be vested in a national oil company or 
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retained by the host government. It is not, as is the case with 
a Concession Agreement, conferred on the oil company. 
As with a Concession, the oil company takes the risk of oil not 
being discovered. However, the oil company is remunerated in 
a different way. No rent is payable and the contractor, as well 
as being allowed to recover costs, takes a portion of the oil as 
its profit. 
3. Risk Service Contract is similar to a Production Sharing 
Agreement but the oil company generally recovers both 
expenses and profit in the form of cash rather than oil. 
Sometimes the oil company is given the option of purchasing a 
proportion of the production at an agreed price as it s profit. 
Which Contract 
The essential differences between the three types of contract are to 
be found in: 
1 . The legal nature of the interest held by the oil company; and 
2. Remuneration. 
With a Concession the oil company has a right which may place it in a 
stronger position in the host country. In all three types of contract 
the oil company bears the risk of oil not being discovered, but it can 
be rewarded in one of three ways: 
by taking all the oil but paying sums to the host government as 
rent, tax and/or royalties (as in the Concession Agreement};-
being paid costs and fixed profit in cash, possibly with the 
option of taking the profit in the form of oil (as in the Risk 
Service contract). 
The choice- of agreement will largely depend on the attitude of the 
host government to its natural resources. A Production Sharing 
Agreement or Risk Service Contract is particularly likely to be chosen 
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if the host government is strongly protective of its natural resources. 
4. Aspects of License Negotiation 
Before allocation of license or contracts, the authorities have to 
decide the size of each license or contracts. The size of 
licenses varies considerably around the world. The English 
licenses consist usually of one block which is about 250 square 
kilome_yes, while in Africa, a license may be 5000-10000 
square kilometres or even more. 
There are advantages and disadvantages with both small and 
large licenses. The main advantages of large licenses are that; 
They give the licensee more freedom and therefore very 
attractive to the companies if the geological potential is 
uncertain. 
Planning of development is easier. 
On the other hand the advantages of smaller licenses are: 
They give the authorities more influence and 
flexibility. This is especially important in a more mature 
area like the North Sea. 
In mature areas with smaller licenses, the spread of 
information will usually be easier, and ideas for new 
exploration models will emerge much quicker. 
Some of the same arguments can be made with regard to the 
question of the length of concessions or contracts. Longer 
terms give the licensees more freedom, but less control for the 
authorities. 
The licenses may be given for both exploration and production 
as it is done in Norway, or the host country can choose to give 
one license for exploration and a separate license for the 
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development and production period. The advantage with one 
license is that it leads to automatic relinquishment at the end of 
the exploration period of all acreage not converted into a 
production license. The main advantage of only one license is 
that the licensee~ will have the right to exploit this. 
The allocation of blocks or areas, can take place in rounds, 
through separate announcement and allocation of one block or 
area, .?r by allocating licenses whenever the companies apply 
for them. This third option is for obvious reasons applicable 
only in less attractive areas. 
The two main systems for allocation of licensees are the 
discretionary system which can be divided into group 
applications and company by company applications and the 
auction system. 
The discretionary system implies that the host country's 
authorities allocate licenses after applications from the 
companies and following negotiations. 
The negotiating part of this system may include several issues, 
such as work program, fixed increased interest or sliding scales 
in bonuses. 
The auction system implies, as the name indicates, that the 
company or group of companies that offers the highest price 
gets the area. The host country usually uses a pre-qualification 
system to limit the number of bidders. 
The main advantages of the discretionary system, is that it 
secures direct control for the government, for instance to 
allocate licenses to companies from several different countries, 
and also to give credit to companies that for example 
contril:,ute to the strengthening of the host country's economy. 
It also encourages exploration of what is thought to be less 
attractive areas more than the auction system. The 
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discretionary system thus makes it easier to ensure national 
preferences. 
The main disadvantage is that it "gives away" the best areas at 
the same price as the less attractive areas. There are however 
other ways to "increase the - price" of an attractive area than 




- CHAPTER II -
This chapter examines the need for oil importing 
developing countries to promote oil exploration 
activity in their regions and mentions those factors 
necessary to achieve this. 
PROMOTION OF OIL EXPLORATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
1 . Introduction 
At the present time there is no shortage of oil. Despite 
this apparent abundance of oil, the world reserves are 
being depleted faster than they are being found. Oil 
consumption began barely one hundred years ago and 
despite world wide exploration efforts we are already 
approaching the point where known oil is half gone. 
Moreover the large consumers are rapidly depleting their 
domestic resources. Known reserves in the USA, USSR, 
and most European countries will be largely depleted by 
the end of this century. This grim outlook is offset by the 
huge reserves in the OPEC countries, particularly in the 
Middle East, which hold more reserves than the rest of the 
world together. 
The industrialised countries rely on oil and gas for 65% of 
their total energy consumption. Unless oil is continuously 
discovered, it is quite possible that oil shortages will occur 
not many years from now, and in the long term, scarcity 
and high prices seem inevitable. 
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In this perspective one would expect petroleum exploration 
to promote itself. However, from a South African 
perspective the question is how to achieve this. South 
Africa can readily be described as an oil developing 
country {OIDC). On a more macro scale one could argue 
for the need to divert oil exploration activity to all OIDCs. 
Some 100 OIDCs represent about 40% of the world 
population, but account for only 10% of the world oil 
consumption of which most must be imported . 
In South Africa this figure has as a result of the secrecy 
laws surrounding inter-alia crude oil imports not been easy 
to determine but would represent a significant percentage 
of our imports. Indigenous production from Sasol 
accounts for approximately 45% of local consumption. 
Mossgas at full production will add approximately another 
7%. 
This does not necessarily mean that the OIDC's have poor 
petroleum potential. More often it means that they are 
under explored, {this statement is not necessarily true for 
South Africa which has had a relatively active program of 
exploration both on and offshore primarily through Soekor 
{Pty) Ltd, a wholly owned company of the State). The 
intensification of exploration in developed countries which 
started after the oil crisis in 1973, has so far only had a 
scattered impact in the OIDCs, and particularly little in the 
yet non producing countries. 
2. National Exploration Incentive 
The incentive for a state to undertake petroleum 
exploration will vary from country to country. Oil and gas 
make up only 10% total energy consumed in SADCC 
{South_. African Development Co-ordination Conference) 
where traditional fuels like wood and charcoal dominate 
the picture. In the industrialised countries the oil and gas 
share is around 65%. 
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Conservation and alternative energy development is not 
likely to change the role of petroleum as the predominant 
source of energy of the commE1rcial sector; development 
means increasing demand for oil products. 
Most analysts believe that throughout this century 
petroleum demand will grow more rapidly in the 
developing countries than in the industrialised world. 
Indeed, access to convenient forms of energy at affordable 
prices is a prerequisite for economic development. Many 
developing countries import all their petroleum. The rise in 
real price for oil over the last 1 5 years has lead to a 
sizeable increase in the oil import bills, and a 
corresponding drain of foreign exchange earnings in these 
countries. The price drop in 1986 changed this situation 
for the better, but the petroleum bill is still a constraint for 
development. In the SADCC countries for example, oil 
imports consume an average of 20% of the foreign 
exchange earnings, with individual countries spending 
more than 50% of the export earnings on petroleum 
product import. With a medium to long term expectation 
of significant price increases for oil, the situation is 
serious. It is widely accepted, therefore, that increasing 
indigenous supplies of petroleum in the OIDCs is an 
imperative goal. It may be the only way for some 
countries to reduce their financial deficits without slowing 
down their economic growth. Oil exploration, therefore, 
needs to be intensified without slowing down their 
economic growth. 
Most of the exploration activity however takes place 
outside the OIDC's. 
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Lack of potential is in general not the reason for low 
exploration activity in the OIDCs. Indeed in the late 
1960's through to today the real reason for the lack of 
interest in South Africa has been political uncertainty 
surrounding any investment. However, from the results 
achieved after 20 years of prospecting by Soekor, the 
prospectivity of the area as a whole must be in some 
doubt. 
It should be noted, that many OIDCs have a comparatively 
low consumption, and one single discovery may make 
them net exporters. This total consumption of the SADCC 
countries for example is less than the output of the 
recently discovered Palanca/Pacassa field in Angola. 
The host country will therefore consider petroleum 
development as a foreign exchange earner beyond the 
domestic energy demand. Petroleum activity, when 
properly controlled, will also have a positive effect on 
other national sectors such as employment, transport and 
communication, training and education, trade and general 
infrastructure development. 
3. National Sovereignty 
State sovereignty over national resources is an established 
doctrine of international law. It is imperative that the 
State realise this valuable asset. Control can be exercised 
by a strong technically skilled State company or through 
transnationals - the latter course of action, however, 
should not result in abdication on the part of the State. 
Historically the transnational oil companies have had the 
leading initiative in the search for petroleum. 
Some ~ountries which opted for complete and exclusive 
State control in the outset;· have later decided to open for 
participation of foreign companies. These companies' risk 
capital and technology is a positive supplement to the 
national effort to locate and develop petroleum resources. 
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Considering the importance of increasing exploration in the 
OIDCs, and the vast unexplored areas in many of these 
countries, co-operation with the international oil industry 
seem to be appropriate. The question then is how to 
achieve maximum public revenue and maintain control 
with the oil company participation. Recognising that the 
objectives of the State and those of the oil companies are 
not .n~_cessarily the same, the common goal to discover 
and develop petroleum resources should be a sufficient 
base for a long term partnership. Appropriate legislation 
and petroleum agreements will serve to maintain 
sovereignty over the resources. 
4. Exploration Promotion 
Assuming that international oil company participation is 
wanted in the national petroleum resources development, 
exploration promotion may be defined as an effort to 
attract commercial exploration on acceptable terms. The 
host country will require effective exploration of all 
prospective areas. Promotion may, therefore, be 
necessary also for countries with existing production. 
Individual countries will compete to attract a finite amount 
of exploration dollars. Up to now the oil importing 
developing countries have lost in this competition even if 
their geological potential appears to be attractive. 
5. Oil Company Exploration Incentive 
The incentive for international oil companies to invest in 
petroleum exploration is in principle very simple. An 
investment is analysed in terms of rate return to the 
company. The return on investment over its life should 
equal pr better the average cost of capital. 
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Underlying the rate of return analyses is the assumption 
that there are alternative exploration investments 
competing for the limited financial resources of the 
company. These resources are allocated to the investment 
yielding the highest rate of return for their perceived risk 
level. 
The principal investment criteria are, however, highest 
return and least risk. Risk has many facets, e.g. 
geological risk and political risk. 
6. Determining Factors in Exploration Investment 
When an oil company is looking to make up a portfolio of 
exploration ventures,. regard is had to several key 
questions namely; 
How promising is the geological prospect? 
What constitutes the legal and fiscal regime? 
How developed is the infrastructure? 
What is the political risk? 
Geological Prospectivity 
The occurrence of petroleum is linked to the deep 
sedimentary basins. Commercial accumulations require 
adequate source beds, reservoirs, and structure for 
entrapment and accumulation. Oil and gas, as other 
natural resources, have a very uneven distribution around 
the world, and the quantity of undiscovered oil remains an 
uncertain estimate. It is in this environment of risk and 
uncertainty that exploration investment decisions are 
made. Geological risk declines with increasing knowledge 
of a basin. Existing production in the same basin, or 
seismic data which demonstrate prospectivity, will greatly 
reduce geological risk. The expected size distribution of 
discoveries is also likely to influence activity level. 
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Exploration cost per barrel declines as field sizes increases, 
and investments are likely to be greater in areas with 
potentially large fields. 
Today most countries· recognise the advantage of a 
resource assessment before commercial licensing of a 
given area. In this way geological risk and the number of 
unknowns about exploration potential may be reduced. 
Legal and Fiscal Regime 
Another risk factor is the price of oil and the price of 
alternative fuels. The oil companies will expect the reward 
of investment, to at least match the risk involved. 
The allocation of risk in exploration investment between 
the host government and the oil company is governed by 
the tax regime and the petroleum contract. The taxation 
schemes in most developing countries include signature 
bonuses, royalties and profit taxes. The two, former parts, 
signature bonuses and royalties tend to allocate most of 
the risk to the company, because they come into effect 
considerably before the company starts making a profit. 
Profit taxes which are determined not by revenue but by 
profit, tend to result in greater risk sharing. 
A tax scheme which involves higher tax rates of the oil 
company's profit when the rate of return exceeds a 
specific level has become common. Such tax systems 
~ 
allow the host government to capture windfall profits 
without greatly distorting the oil company's incentive to 
explore for both large and small fields. This last element is 
important as the majority of the petroleum resources will 




There are a number of contract types in effect in the 
developing countries: 
Concessions 
Production sharing contract 
Risk - or non risk service contracts 
-Joint Ventures 
These contracts represent varying systems for the 
allocation of risk and reward of an exploration project, and 
determine the distribution of operational and management 
responsibility between the oil company and the 
government. See chapter Ill for an analysis of the 
different types of agreements. 
Over the last two decades the developing countries have 
shifted from the reliance on concessions to production 
sharing contracts. The service contracts are mainly 
restricted to countries with existing production or proven 
reserves. The recent trend is for greater government 
participation in petroleum investment activity in the 
developing countries. Governments now seem to be ready 
to assume more risk, and participate more actively in 
management and operations of petroleum development 
activities. This can only serve to increase exploration 
activity. 
Infrastructure 
A lack of infrastructure in terms of harbours, roads, 
railways, pipelines, communication systems and general 
supply may reduce the incentive to explore in otherwise 
geologi°cally attractive areas. This is a common problem 
in many developing countries, and is indeed not limited to 
petroleum investment. In an effort to promote exploration 
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activity certain critical public sector investments may be 
required. In this regard South Africa is very well served. 
Political Risk 
Political risk is difficult to define in as much as it is 
perceived differently by different companies. It reflects 
the uncertainty that the business environment may change 
due to.. __ political events. At present South African political 
risk is high and hopefully will reduce after the general 
elections scheduled for next year. 
In terms of promotion there is little one can do about this 
investment criteria. It is important, however, that 
contracts and negotiations with the oil companies have 
broad political support, as they may result in- long term 
business relationships of critical importance to both the 
State and the company. 
7. National Preparations for Commercial Exploration 
As shown, there are a variety of factors which determine 
whether or not the oil companies will invest in exploration. 
To effectively compete for the limited risk capital available, 
and to obtain exploration investment on acceptable terms, 
the country needs to be well prepared. The preparations 
should be performed in parallel in two main activity areas: 
Resource assessment 
Institutional development 
The exploration terms, the size and scope of the national 
organisation, and the financial and economic scenarios all 
· depend on the undiscovered oil in the ground. The natural 
starti_fl9 point therefore, is the resource assessment. In 
countries where exploration has been going on for some 
time, the assessment may be based on existing data. In 
previously unexplored areas, the host country is well 
advised to do geophysical- and geological reconnaissance 
surveys prior to licensing. The geophysical work may 
include gravity measurements, aeromagnetic- and regional 
seismic surveys. In onshore basins the geophysical work 
will be complemented by geological field mapping and 
sampling. In the event that the composition of the 
sedimentary rock sequence is unknown or disputed, 
stratigraphic wells in key locations may be considered. 
All av~ilable data should go into the resources evaluation, 
which will give an indication of the hydrocarbon potential 
of the respective basins: 
Has oil been generated? 
What are the realistic play concepts? 
Where are the prospective trends? 
What may be the nature and the potential size range of the 
accumulations? 
What is the relative ranking of the prospective 
areas? 
It is worth noting that geological provinces and 
sedimentary basins are often shared between two or more 
countries. The most effective evaluation of such basins 
may be done through exchange of data and regional co-
operation. 
The resource evaluation is a critical input in defining an 
exploration strategy: 
What is the appropriate size of the licence areas? 
What work obligations should apply? 
What may be the appropriate licensing schedule? 
Operational and environmental considerations. 
Appropriate level of government participation. 
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Just as the resource evaluation may form basis for the 
government's strategic planning, it may constitute the 
basis for the oi.1 companies analysis of possible exploration 
investment. In the past, host governments were mostly at 
a disadvantage in the negotiations with oil companies, 
because the companies knew more about the resource 
potential. 
Today-.this is changing, and ideally the government agency 
which controls all available data, should have a leading 
role in the evaluation of national resources. They are 
thereby in a better position to promote activity. 
On the institutional side, the terms of the model agreement 
need to be matched to the apparent prospectivity and 
geological risk as received after the resource assessment. 
In accordance with the expected level of activity, the 
government will develop appropriate organisations and 
administrative systems to look after its interests. In a 
promotion context, a good data base and data retrieval 
systems are imperative. 
8. The Mechanism of Promotion 
Exploration terms will in most cases be determined 
beforehand through the Petroleum Law and Model 
Agreement. The key issue in the promotion campaign 
therefore, is to demonstrate the geological promise of the 
areas offered for licensing and to show that it is worth the 
price. This may be done through the preparation of an 
evaluation report. 
The oil companies are very professional and the 
interpretations and evaluation offered must be equally 
professional. At the same time the underlying raw data 
must be available for control and indep~ndent 
interpretations by the companies. This may be done by 
preparing data packages and offering them for sale to the 
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oil companies. This is a mechanism frequently used to 
recover cost of data acquisition. 
The promotion reports, however, should not be given a 
price that discourages interested companies to have a first 
look at the exploration potential. Ideally the promotion 
campaign should not be prohibited by a requirement to 
make money in the process. This has often proved to be 
count~rproductive. 
Before addressing the industry, the following items should 
be prepared in a presentable form: 
Relevant legislation 
Model agreement 
Listing and price schedule for available data 
A technical evaluation report 
Definition of areas offered for licensing 
A time schedule of licensing 
A review of infrastructure, political, and institutional 
issues as required. 
The way of addressing the industry may vary. The more 
attractive countries may prepare joint presentations to the 
industry in key locations such as London and Houston. 
More important are the bilateral follow up meetings after 
these presentations. Those countries who do not have 
professionals who may enter into concrete discussions 
with the oil companies, technically or otherwise, should 
contract such services during the promotion campaign. 
Conveying your message to an audience of oil companies 
scattered around the world, is a practical problem. One 
method is to give the promotion brochures and technical 
report~ a large circulation. Promotion articles may also be 
filed with the large periodicals. 
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Promotion, however, is not a one time exercise. Once the 
hydrocarbon potential has been established and made 
known, companies may visit at any time according to their 
internal strategies. The host countries should have 
resources available internally or by external arrangement, 
to discuss technical or contractual issues as required on 
such occasions. 
9. Financial Considerations 
Exploration promotion in the wider sense include all 
national efforts to prepare for and attract investment in 
exploration. It is quite common to experience what may 
be called 'thresholds' in exploration activity; points where 
commercial investment halts, and a national effort is 
required to prove new incentives. Effective promotion 
may therefore require substantial human and financial 
resources. Seismic for example, which is the key tool in 
exploration, will cost in the range of 1.000 USO per 
kilometre offshore and 10.000 USO per kilometre onshore, 
including processing. Even a reconnaissance coverage 
may therefore amount to many millions of dollars. 
Integrated basin studies and resource assessments require 
the joint effort of geologists geophysicists, geochemists 
and stratigraphers, often with a high degree of 
specialisation. 
10. Conclusion 
As the petroleum resources in parts of North America and 
Europe are being depleted, operators in this areas have 
started to look for new investment opportunities 
elsewhere. Possible future increases in the real price for 
petroleum, will give further incentive to explore new areas. 
A large share of the oil to be discovered in the future 
exists in developing countries. With proper preparation in 
terms of resource assessment to demonstrate the 
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hydrocarbon potential and institutional framework, to 
facilitate petroleum exploration and development, the oil 
companies will be attracted to these areas. 
The burden of petroleum imports represent a maJor 
constraint for development in the oil importing developing 
countries. It is essential that those countries with a 
domestic potential including South Africa recognize this 
opportunity and set about realising it as soon as possible. 
Although the results of SOEKOR' s efforts have proved 
thus far to be discouraging its activity should not be 
entirely stopped. Progress at a reduced level of 
investment should be considered with a promotional 
campaign as set out above being vigorously pursued. 
0000000 
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- CHAPTER Ill -
This chapter cursorily examines the various types of oil agreements 
found in oil exploration transactions. 
TYPES OF MAJOR PETROLEUM ARRANGEMENTS 
Despite the wide diversity of international usage, all arrangements 
may be classified into a half-dozen systems. 
Types of Petroleum Arrangements 
Petroleum arrangements fall into the following: 
1 . Concession 
The concession is generally known as a 'Permit', 'License' or 
'Lease'. It is the oldest and still most widely used petroleum 
agreement. 
2. Production Sharing Contract· 
This concept originated in the early 1960's and is increasingly 
used around the world. 
3. Risk Service Contract 
This is a relatively new concept. Its first appearance was 
during the 1970's. 
4. Service Contract 
This is an old form of petroleum arrangement which is used 
principally for risk-free operations and, therefore, is of lesser 
importance in exploration. 
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5. Joint Venture 
Overlying all these arrangements is the joint venture. The joint 
venture is not a type of petroleum arrangement but only a 
partnership between a company having a concession or 
contract and another company (frequently a government 
company) by which they agree to jointly operate the venture. 
They do this under their agreed partnership rules, the 'operating 
agre·ernent.' Such a joint venture and operating agreement 
exists between the State owned oil company, SOEKOR (Pty) 
Ltd and Engen Ltd a South African company listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
6. Nationalisation 
As a final category in the types of world petroleum 
arrangements there is the option of complete nationalisation of 
the domestic petroleum industry and its operations by the 
national government without participation by international 
companies. In many instances, however, it has been necessary 
to enter into petroleum concessions or contracts with 
international companies following nationalisation in order to 
have access to their expertise or for financial reasons. 
The basic aspects of a petroleum arrangement between an 
international company (be it public of private} and a government are: 
1 . Risk & Financing 
It is common to all forms of petroleum agreements to place the 
risk on the international company. As professional risk-takers, 
international oil companies are willing to provide financial and 
technical resources for exploration and to assume the risk of 
failure. They expect to receive, in the event of success, 
comp-ensation in the form of recovery of their initial investment, 
and profit in cash or in oil and gas. 
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2. Economic Return (Profit) 
In the event of success, the international partner expects to 
earn a profit commensurate with risk. The same economic 
return can be achieved through the use of concession, 
production sharing contract, or risk service contract through 
varying taxation rates, the financial aspects of production 
sharing, depreciation rules, equity shares, oil purchase prices, 
and ·fe-es. Given a sufficient number of such parameters, and 
considering exposure to risk as a factor to be considered 
separately, it is possible to achieve the same financial outcome 
with different forms of petroleum arrangements. 
3. Management 
This is the amount of influence and direction that the 
international company is allowed to exercise in the conduct of 
its operations and on the planning of its development and 
exploration investment schedules. The degree of freedom in 
management allowed the international company is closely 
defined in the petroleum law or contract. It may be very wide 
or very restricted with regard to one or every stage of an 
operation. In practice, however, the international company is 
generally designated the operator of the venture and, subject to 
supervision by government inspectors and a management 
committee with government representatives, exercises de facto 
control over activities. The amount of control varies with the 
capabilities of the international company and of the government 
or its National Oil Company (NOC) and the amount of 
confidence which the government or its NOC place in their 
partner. 
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4. Division of Production 
The division of oil or gas production is the fundamental 
difference between the various types of petroleum 
arrangements. By this is meant the physical quantity of 
realised petroleum (oil and gas) production to which the 
international company is given access to in one form or other; 
i.e. the manner in which the quantity of petroleum produced is 
physic-ally divided between the government and the 
international company. In the concession the total production 
typically accrues to the international company, subject to 
payment of tax and other obligations. In the production sharing 
contract, production is divided, after cost recovery in stated 
proportions between the government and the international oil 
company. In the risk service contract, production accrues to 
the government and the company is compensated only · by 
payment. 
BASIC ELEMENTS OF A PETROLEUM GRANT 
Duration 
The concession (or contract) is divided into three major phases: ( 1) 
reconnaissance phase; (2) exploration phase; and (3) the exploitation 
phase. 
1 . Reconnaissance 
Some concessions have a preliminary phase called the 
Reconnaissance License (or permit). This is a non-exclusive 
permit of short duration, usually one to two years, which gives 
the right to conduct surface work only such as geological or 
geophysical, but does not include exploratory wells except for 
shallow 'core holes' drilled for geological information. This 
phase is sometimes replaced by the 'Geophysical Option', the 
right to do geophysical work and, depending upon the results, 
the drilling of exploration wells. 
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2. Exploration 
The duration of an exclusive license to explore for oil and gas, 
including drilling, varies from one country to another. The 
length of the exploration period must be sufficient. to enable a 
prudent operator to carry out an efficient and adequate 
exploration program, but not so long as to permit the licensee 
to remain passive. The exploration period is normally between 
three and six years, in some cases even longer. 
Exploration duration is subject to renewal or extension under 
special conditions or expiration if production is not found. 
Exploration rights can usually be renewed for specified periods. 
Such renewal is subject to the holder's satisfactory 
performance of his exploration obligations, such as required 
investment having been made, the wells specified having been 
drilled, etc. 
Many countries offer renewals of the original term for a 
specified number of times. Thus the original maximum duration 
of, say, four years, can be renewed for four years several 
times. How many times it can be renewed is up to the 
government involved. Usually two renewals can be given, with 
an extension available at the end of any one of them in case a 
well is drilling as the period ends. In this case an additional six-
month period is usually given to enable completion of the well 
and assessment of the area. 
On expiration of the exploration period without commercial 
discovery having been made the contract automatically expires 
in the majority of countries. 
The exploration agreement / licence should include the right to 
exploh oil found in commercial quantities and there should exist 
clarity on the basis this is to be done. See Chapter V when the 




Exploitation duration is usually twenty and thirty years. The 
original Middle East durations were very long but most of those 
concessions have been nationalised. 
Relinquishment 
There is a normal requirement in almost all countries to relinquish a 
certain portion of the of the exploration area within stated time limits. 
Generally, these obligations are more strict in proven oil countries 
than in countries with a lower potential for oil production. 
Conservation 
For the host government it is important to ensure that, in any given 
operation, maximum technical efficiency is achieved in extraction. A 
government should therefore, on the one hand, in its legislation or 
agreements have the necessary powers to regulate production based 
on sound conservation principles and, on the other hand, should 
acquire the necessary expertise to ensure that operations are 
conducted in conformity with the government's regulations and 
decisions. 
Provisions to . avoid pollution can be incorporated with conservation 
requirements. 
Flaring of natural gas may be necessary since associated gas is 
unavoidably produced with the oil. Secondary recovery may make 
use of the major portion of this gas if there is no other economic use. 
In any case, the decision as to whether to allow flaring should be left 
to competent technical authorities. 
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Crude Oil Marketing 
In many countries the oil company is obliged, at the request of the 
government, to purchase the state's share of the production or 
market it as an agent on behalf of the government. 
It is important to have clearly defined contractual provisions to 
determine the price, terms of payment, notification periods for 
exercise of options, etc. If the price is to be agreed between the 
parties based on the market value or, failing that, by arbitration, it will 
be important to have mechanisms which ensure that discussions or 
disputes do not disturb the regular marketing of the oil, e.g., by 
providing that payments will be based on the last agreed or stipulated 
price, subject to later adjustment. · 
Title To Assets 
Under some legislative and contractual relationships, title to assets 
imported by the company for operations passes to the host country at 
the moment of importation. This does not include leased assets, such 
as contract drilling rigs. The company is given the right to the use of 
such assets until the expiration of its rights. 
Where an oil company owns the production facilities, the legislation or 
agreement will often provide that the ownership of these assets will 
revert to the state upon expiry or termination of the license or 
agreement. It may be necessary, for environmental or other reasons, 
to remove the facilities which may in some cases be extremely 
expensive. Therefore, it will often be useful if the legislation provides 
the State with an option to either take possession of the assets or to 
request that they should be removed by the oil company. 
Guarantees of Performance 
A frequently found provision in legislation or contracts is a 
requirement that the oil company must provide guarantees for its 
performance under a license or agreement, including its fulfilment of 
the work obligations. Such guarantees may also comprise any liability 
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which the oil company may incur in respect of its activities, for 
example, for pollution damage. 
Domestic Demand 
Most contracts and legislation contain a requirement to meet the 
national demand for oil and gas out of local production. Such 
provisions are more important the less the government's royalty in 
kind or share- of production is. 
Normally, the requirement to supply oil or gas will be shared among 
the producing companies pro rata to their production. If the oil 
company has domestic refining capacity, it will be useful to also add a 
requirement to refine the crude oil which has been placed at the 
disposal of the government, on reasonable terms. 
The price at which the petroleum supplied for national demand is 
crucial and varies widely. Most often it is based on the international 
price, however,, there are many examples of countries that oblige 
produces to supply their pro-rata share of crude for national demand 
at prices much lower than the marketplace. 
Refining Obligation 
The grant of a license or contract to explore for and produce 
petroleum can be made subject to a requirement that the oil company 
must establish a refinery or other plants to process petroleum. 
It is, however, often difficult to negotiate very specific obligations in 
this regard, for example, because the viability of such ventures may 
depend upon the size of any discoveries which may be made, and 
particularly depends on the size of the domestic market since 
refineries must be large scale to be economic. 
Preference For Use of Domestic Goods and Services 
Generally the legislation obliges the oil companies to purchase 
domestically produced goods and services, normally subject to the 
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proviso that such goods and services are available on competitive 
terms. World Bank financed projects allow a cost differential of up to 
15 percent in favour of local suppliers. The Mining lease granted to 
Mossgas (Pty) Ltd contains such a requirement. 
Training 
Most legislation or contracts today contain provisions obliging the oil 
companies to provide training of nationals of the host country. It is 
important for a government that these obligations are as specific as 
possible, and such obligations should comprise both training of 
personnel for the oil company's own operations and training of 
personnel from the national oil company, the government and relevant 
government agencies. 
It is essential that training should be of both a theoretical and 
practical nature and comprise all aspects of the petroleum industry. 
Other Taxes and Fees 
It is generally true that the agreements between companies and 
governments for oil exploration and development specify income tax, 
royalty, occasionally a surface tax, and sometimes a stamp tax. They 
generally, however, specifically exempt the companies from payment 
of taxes other than those specified in the agreement or in the 
petroleum legislation. Export taxes are rarely levied, nor are import or 
export duties. (See Chapter V for a discussion of this aspect in the 
context of prospecting least (OP26) granted to SOEKOR (Pty) Ltd.) 
Income Tax 
For a number of reasons an income tax is generally paid on 
production. For one, an obligation to pay a relatively high rate of tax 
on realised profits appears less burdensome to an oil company than 
an obligation to pay a heavy royalty, (the different types of tax and 
royalties and their affects are recorded in Chapter IV). 
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Minimum Investment 
The minimum investment program usually refers to the exploratory 
period. There is no feasible means of estimating what development 
and production expenditure will be needed. It may not always be 
presumed that the oil company will, in its own interest, proceed as 
rapidly as it can to develop production, therefore, control must be 
exercised during development as well. 
When an exclusive exploration ("drilling") license is granted, either as 
the first step or following upon a non-exclusive reconnaissance 
permit, it becomes important to obtain firm commitments from the 
license holder or contractor. 
Supply of Information 
An obligation to submit on a current basis all information obtained 
during the exploratory work is normally contained in the legislation or 
contracts. It is important for the government to ensure that this 
obligation comprises all relevant data (e.g., geological maps and 
structural maps, logs, samples, and cores, etc.) and that the 
obligatiohs are implemented. 
PIETROLEUM CONCESSION 
The concession was the original system used in world petroleum 
arrangements, and it is still the most widely used today. Where 
legislation has been enacted to govern petroleum it may be called a 
license or permit (exploration) or a lease (exploration). 
The concession is an arrangement whereby the oil company received 
the right, in exchange for its payment of all costs and specified taxes, 
to explore for petroleum and, if production is found, to produce, and 
market the oil or gas. The right to transport hydrocarbons discovered 
is usually included. 
In exchange, the company pays, in addition to the costs, ( 1) royalty 
and (2) income tax; some minor taxes may be levied as well. 
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The company is usually given export right to crude oil or gas 
produced subject to various obligations. Such obligations are 
extensive. 
Other 
The basic difference between concession and a petroleum contract, 
be it produ_c:tion sharing or a risk service type, is that all the 
production is acquired by the concessionaire. 
PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT 
The three basic elements of a production sharing contract are: cost 
recovery a production 'split' between the government and the oil 
company and income tax. 
The concept of production sharing originated in Indonesia where it 
was first used in agriculture. It was later adapted for petroleum and 
first used in the IIAPCO contract of 1966. The concept in now also 
used in Peru, Malaysia, Guatemala, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, 
Bangladesh, and the Philippines, among others. 
Production sharing is carried out with the government, usually 
through its state oil company. This would appear to give a greater 
degree of control over operations of the private contractor, but in fact 
production sharing contracts generally operate unde_r the management 
of the risk-taking private partner. 
Participation 
The state may participate in the production sharing contract in a joint 
venture. Many countries, in contracts signed with private companies, 
have reserved the option to participate upon notice of commercial 
discovery. This effectively 'carries' the State through exploration. 
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Cost Recovery 
The concept of cost recovery also originated in Indonesia, where the 
first 40% of production went to the contractor to cover costs. The 
percentage varies in other countries, generally between 20% and 
40%. One country (Peru) structured production sharing contracts to 
exclude cost recovery, compensating by giving the oil company a 
higher (50%) share of production, with tax paid by Petroperu, the 
State company. 
Peru's 1980 tax amendments eliminated the tax payment by 
Petroperu but still provide no cost recovery. 
Production Split 
Following deduction of cost recovery, production is divided between 
the oil company and the State. This is known as the production 
"split", and it varies widely. Some countries vary the production split 
with production levels. 
The variation between production splits around the world is not as 
striking as it may seem, for the oil company is subject to income tax 
on its share and regardless of the split the rate of return to the oil 
company can be controlled by varying tax rates. 
Tax 
Around the world oil companies are generally subject to national 
corporate income taxes on their share of production. The 85% OPEC 
income tax does not apply to production sharing contracts but only to 
production under the old style concessions. One OPEC country, 
Libya, does not impose income tax on production sharing contracts at 
all, but divides production 81 % government 1 9% company free of 
tax. 
Other provisions of the production sharing contract dealing with 
exploration and exploitation duration, size of area, relinquishment, 
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employment of nationals and training, etc are similar to those 
contained in concessions, as previously reviewed. 
PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENT -
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Subsoil Rights: 
Exclusive title to subsoil and to conduct petroleum operations is given 
f 
to the NOc.-- The latter has the authority to conclude agreements with 
oil companies who are then considered Contractor to the NOC. 
Management 
Contractor is operator and works under the supervision of the NOC. 
Risk 
Contractor provides all the funds for the operations and carries all the 
risks involved. 
Title of Assets 
All assets accrue to the NOC, either immediately upon acquisition or 
gradually with or after depreciation. 
Cost Recovery 
When the ventures reaches the producing stage the Contractor will 
recover its 'allowable' costs out of the production. Sometimes the 
volumes available for cost recovery is limited by stipulating either a 
maximum or a fixed percentage of the available production. 
Allowable costs are defined in a manner similar to those usually 
applied for taxation purposes, i.e. using depreciation and amortisation 
rules. 
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A combination of both restrictions, by way of volume and of 
depreciation rules, is also possible. 
The part of production that is used for cost recovery is called I Cost 
Oil' or 'Cost Recovery Crude Oil.' 
The agreement will contain rules for the determination of the value of 
the oil for cost recovery purposes. 
Production Split 
The balance of the available production, normally called "Profit Oil", 
which is what remains of the production after deduction of the Cost 
Oil, is shared between the NOC and the Contractor in agreed 
proportions usually dependent on production levels achieved; i.e. at 
higher production levels, frequently on an incremental (sliding scale) 
basis, Profit Oil is split in proportions more favourable to the NOC. 
There are agreements where there is no Cost Oil, all being treated as 
Profit Oil. Under such agreements there is no need to establish rules 
for determination of the value of the oil. 
Taxation 
Contractor is either exempt from all taxes on income or remains 
subject to such taxation. In the later case such taxes are either paid 
by the NOC on behalf of the Contractor or will be paid by the 
Contractor himself. Where the Contractor is exempt from taxation or 
where the NOC pays the taxes on his behalf the Contractor receives 
his share of the Profit Oil free from any fiscal burden and in the latter 
case is put in a position to show to the fiscal authorities of his home 
country that the local taxes on income have been paid - in order to 
obtain a tax credit against local taxes. 
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RISK SERVICE CONTRACT 
The risk service contract shares the usual elements of duration, work 
obligations, etc, with concession and production sharing contracts, 
but differs in important aspects. Its basic distinctive feature is that is 
pays the oil company in cash, not in crude oil (although it may have 
provisions permitting the company to buy back an amount of crude at 
international prices from established production). 
Risk 
The risk contract typically places all risk and investment on the 
Contractor, who provides capital for exploration and production. If no 
discovery is made the contract ceases to exist. If discovery is made, 
the contractor places it on stream. Thereafter it may be operated by 
the State or, in some cases, by the Contractor. Capital is reimbursed 
with interest and a risk fee. 
Taxation 
Contractors are subject to taxation usually at general corporate rates. 
Here again taxation is of lesser importance, since the service contract 
'fee' or production payment also determines profits: the higher the fee 
the higher the tax. 
The risk contract generally has the same specifications as the 
concession as regards area, size of contract area, relinquishments, 
etc. 
SERVICE CONTRACT (NON-RISK) 
The pure service contract is a simple contract of work wherein the 
contractor is paid a flat fee for his services. An example of 
importance is the Aramco contract in Saudi Arabia. Aramco, the major 
oil company in the country, carries on production operations for the 
Saudi government for a net fee of about 1 5 cents per barrel (plus 
inflation), after tax. Exploration is also carried out, and risk is 
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rewarded with additional crude from reserves found plus an additional 
6 cents per barrel on new oil. 
Another example of a pure service contract is the Total contract in 
Abu Dhabi where the government's offshore field (Zakum) is operated 
by Total for a per-barrel fee, plus the right to buy part of its 
production. 
Tax 
Service contracts are subject to general corporate taxation, but not 
to higher special petroleum taxes. 
In effect, these contracts operate without profit to the company. 
Since there is little incentive, their efficiency is yet to be proved. 
Types of Contracts 
There are two categories: 
1) The Service Contract running parallel, but contractually 
unconnected, with a purchase contract for part of the oil being 
produced from the area or operations to which the Service 
Contract, relates or; 
2) The Service Contract not accompanied by any access to the oil 
being produced under such Contract. 
JOINT VENTURE 
The joint venture has been widely misunderstood as being a separate 
type of petroleum agreement. It is not. It is a partnership 
arrangement wherein the State, either directly or through its national 
oil company (NOC), received an equity or ownership interest in the 
rights and obligations of a contract or a concession. The State may 
achieve this through 'participation', or nationalisation, as in the partial 
nationalisations or enforced participations throughout the world e.g. 
Libya, Nigeria, United Kingdom, Norway. It may originate in the 
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structure of the arrangement from the first. As a partner, the State 
shares in the production from the contract or concession in proportion 
to its interest; thus 25% joint venture interest would accord right to 
25% or production. In addition, the associated oil company pays 
taxes and/or production sharing on its share of production, so the 
benefits to the State are two-fold. 
Costs 
The State or its NOC shares in the costs in equity's proportion. 
Frequently, however, the arrangement provides that the private 
partner assume part of the government's risk, State to assume its 
share of costs only after production is discovered. This arrangement 
is called a 'carry.' The State's share of costs is repaid either directly 
by the State, or through allocation of part of the State's share of the 
joint venture production to the oil company. 
Cost Reimbursement 
Exploration costs may not be reimbursable to the oil company, i.e. as 
they are not in Norway and Libya. Once production begins, however, 
the State normally pays its share of operating costs. The State may 
be 'carried through development', in which case the State or its NOC 
will be carried to the point of production. It then becomes essential 
to have a clear definition of when commercial production begins, 
since from that point on the State will share in costs. 
The farther the State is carried, the lower the return it must expect to 
obtain. Thus the State when 'carried through development' would 
normally receive a lower share in the joint venture or the production 
split than if carried only through exploration. The advantage to the 
State in both arrangements is that it takes no share of risk exploration 
and may elect to put little money in development since arrangements 




In some cases, interest is paid on exploration and development costs 
advanced by the oil company. In Brazil, development moneys 
advanced are repaid plus interest from production. 
Participation 
The goverrn:nent' s participation amount in production is not 
determined by the oil company's estimate of the potential size of 
discoveries, costs of development, political risk, and other factors. 
The final production split may vary with these factors, but the State 
must decide on the amount of its participation on the basis of its own 
financial and technical capabilities. 
Taxes 
Provision can be made in the joint venture concessions or contract to 
accommodate changes in production levels, with the State tax or 
royalty on a sliding scale basis rising with production. This can be 
done with prices as well, with the State share rising with crude oil 
price. 
Advantages 
The State may find advantages in the joint venture approach. The 
greatest risks exist in the exploration phase, and all this is assumed 
by the oil company. Once a commercial discovery has been made 
three may still be some risk but it is normally not difficult to obtain 
financing. Major financial institutions such as the World Bank lend to 
governments at advantageous interest rates, and other international 
and regional development in situations may make financing available. 
Operating Agreement 
Joint ventures require mutual agreement on procedures, such as 
meeting costs of operations in a timely manner. The agreement to 
determine these procedures is knows as an 'operating agreement' or a 
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'joint venture operating agreement'. It contains detailed specifications 
on who is to be the operator, what operations can be performed 
without special permission, etc. A joint management committee may 
be established to pass on important decisions and to decide the future 
course of operations, and other essential details. Voting on the 
management committee is usually proportionate to interests held. 
Often the State holds the post of president of the management 
committee, with the oil company acting as operator. 
Incorporated Vs Unincorporated Status 
The joint venture can be a incorporated or non-incorporated vehicle. 
In the latter case participation shares are held in undivided interest, 
i.e. the NOC and the oil company each own an undivided interest in 
the venture embodied by a mining title and a concession contract with 
the government (in its capacity as grantor of the mining title). Each 
acquires its own share of the production and is responsible for paying 
taxes on his share. The assets used in the ventures are jointly 
owned. 
The NOC and the oil company jointly supervise the operations. 
Usually there exists a joint management or operating committee for 
this purpose. In such committee decisions are taken unanimously or 
by qualified majority, providing that a 51 % to 60% government 
participation will not automatically lead to a power of veto for the 
NOC. In most cases the oil company is the operator of the venture. 
Sometimes, however, the operations are entrusted to the NOC or to a 
non-profit making and no assets owning operating company which is 
jointly owned by the NOC and the oil company in proportion to their 
participating interests. The funding of the operating company takes 
place in accordance with the rules of financial participation agreed in 
the joint venture agreement. 
Participation . may also be implemented on a corporate basis. The 
government or its NOC and the oil company each own its percentage 
interest share of the shares of a company holding a concession 
contract. This will the be a profit making company selling all the 
crude oil produced by the venture and owning all the assets. This 
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form has been chosen in very few cases and then only when a joint 
venture has been introduced at a mature stage of the venture (e.g. 
Brunei). 
The joint company is subject to the fiscal legislation and is responsible 
for the payment of taxes. 
The corporate profits after taxes are divided between the two 
shareholders, viz. the oil company and the government, and paid to 
them in the form of dividends. 
The disadvantages of the incorporated Joint Venture compared to a 
non-incorporated Joint Venture are: 
1) All crude oil is sold by the joint company, which means that 
prices and customers have to be agreed between the 
shareholders. Under an undivided interest set-up each 
Participant acquires its own share of the production and is free 
in the disposal of this share, subject of course to the 
requirements of the applicable legislation and the concession 
contract. 
2) Under the corporate route the participants get their shares of 
the benefits of the venture in the form of dividends. The 
dividend policy is thus a matter that has to be settled in mutual 
agreement. 
The disadvantages are of such importance that where an 
incorporated joint venture is unavoidable the shareholders 
usually make arrangements among themselves allowing direct 
access to the crude oil, thereby, reducing the joint venture to a 
mere operating organisation. 
Buy Back 
In many countries joint venture arrangements have been 
supplemented by buy back provisions, i.e. the oil company has the 
option to buy part of the NOC's share of production. This can also 
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take the form of the oil company selling on behalf of the NOC such " 
part of the NOC's share as the latter is unable to sell itself. 
Assistance In NOC Financing 
In many instances the oil company will make interest bearing loans to 
the NOC in order to enable the latter to fulfil its financing obligations 
under the joint venture contract. 
The repayment of loan and interest is usually tied to the NOC's 
income from the venture and may be effected by the oil company 
lifting a certain percentage (say 60% or 70%), of the crude oil 
accruing to the NOC. Such a link between repayment and production 
introduces another complication for the oil companies and NOC. 
Participation 
In some contracts it has been agreed that upon making a commercial 
discovery the government or its NOC (i.e. the state partner) has the 
option to acquire a minority interest, say 15% to 25%. The 
participation may embrace the whole venture or only th~ discovery 
concerned. Sometimes the state partner's proportions share of the 
exploration expenditure incurred up to the option date is reimbursed 
to the company, sometimes it is not. 
At increasing levels of production from the venture or from the field 
concerned the state partner may have the option to increase its 
percentage interest in the venture or in the field concerned in stages 
up to a previously agreed maximum percentage. In some contracts it 
has been agreed that as compensation for the increase in participation 
the state partner will pay to the oil company a corresponding share of 
the undepreciated/unamortised portion of the expenditure incurred up 
the time of the increases. The reimbursements due are either effected 
in monthly cash instalments or in kind for which purpose a certain 
percentage of the crude oil share of the state partner will be lifted by 
the oil company. 
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When a discovery has been declared commercial the NOC when 
joining in such declaration will immediately receive a 51 % interest in 
such discovery and it will have the right to demand a further increase 
as soon as the production profile for the field has been approved by 
the government in accordance with an agreed scale, linking estimated 
peak production levels with participation interest. If a new 
commercial deposit is found the NOC may demand a further increase 
of participation interest ( in all then current development and 
production) in accordance with the same scale. 
The final participation interest in development and production may be 
in the order of 70 to 75% but will only occur if substantial volumes 
are being produced. 
Comparison 
In summary, each petroleum arrangement has its distinctive 
advantages and drawbacks. While all are risk-free so far as the 
government is concerned, the concession has the advantage of being 
clear and in a familiar form that works. Where a law exists under 
which concessions are given, the guidelines are present and 
government negotiators can stand on the basis of the law ·to press for 
additional advantages. It has the disadvantage of lack of flexibility. 
In this respect the production sharing contract, with its two-edged 
sword of production split and tax, has the advantage. Its 
disadvantage is that unless correctly structured to accommodate 
changes in oil price, its original intent may be lost and the oil 
company either rewarded beyond the original intent or penalised. 
The risk service contract has the advantage of seeming to establish 
production such as secondary recovery projects, or to countries 
where production levels have risen so high that the national treasury 
can afford the huge reinvestment necessary to maintain output, such 
as Saudi Arabia. 
Each government, it seems, must find that arrangement, or mixture of 
arrangements, which best suits its national picture. 
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- CHAPTER IV -
This chapter examines the object of petroleum , taxation and. the _, 
different types of taxes employed by the State(s) to extract their 
'take' and the effects thereof on investment. 
PETROLEUM TAXATION 
In most countries of the world petroleum rights are owned by 
governments, and in disposing of their rights governments normally 
have a number of objectives. The collection of a high share of the. 
economic rents is certainly a major objective in all producing 
countries. Other common objectives are to regulate. the pace, of 
exploration and development, to ensure security of supply for the 
domestic market, to influence the domestic price of petroleum, to 
obtain significant local ownership of an important resot,Jrce, and to: 
enhance local participation in employment and provision of supplie.s _ · · 
and equipment. It is clear that the maximisation' of. r~venues from 
petroleum exploitation is likely to be inconsister:,t with some, of these 
other objectives. For example ,domestic price . controls or the 
imposition of requirements to purchase supplies of equipment locally 
will reduce the revenue base below the level it would .. o.ther.wise,.have,, 
been. 
A main objective of a petroleum taxation system is to collect the 
economic rent of oil and gas production. The rent refers to all returns 
to input factors, which exceeds opportunity costs; i.e. returns 
accruing to a production factor in excess of its return in next most 
valuable alternative use. The supply price of a factor reflects the 
necessary costs and return in order to bring it into use: In order to 
allocate capital and labour they must be paid a sum sufficient to bid 
them away from their alternative use.. The rent refers to the 
difference between the total revenue and the supply price. 
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A desired feature of any fiscal system is to have a built-in flexibility in 
relation to different field sizes and cost conditions in a geological 
province, as well as changes in our prices. Ideally the rent should ber 
collected in different situations, without having to introduce 
discretionary changes in order to obtain rent-skimming. Discretionary 
tax changes is likely to introduce uncertainty to the investor. 
The fiscal system should raise revenue without causing any 
distortions. A key question to any fiscal system is to what extent it 
will have adverse influence on the investment decision and resource 
recovery decision with respect to reaching optimal decisions for the 
society. One has to examine the impact of the total fiscal package 
applied to petroleum exploration and exploitation as compared with 
the pre-tax situation. A fiscal system is considered neutral if the 
after-tax decisions in relation to exploration, development, production 
and abandonment are identical to the pre-tax decisions.· The fiscal 
system should not produce disincentives to explore for new reserves, ' · 
develop new fields and marginal reserves within eachtsingle field. : · ,-,. · 
It is crucial to relate a fiscal system to the geological basis in a 
petroleum province and the position of the exploration province on the 
geological learning curve. It might be directly misleading to make 
comparative studies between different countries . without carefully 
taking into consideration the different geological basis. 
An efficient fiscal package is a balance avoiding both a too liberal · 
approach, which will result in revenue loss, and a too restrictive 
approach, which will result in fewer projects and thus .also revenue 
loss. The challenge is to develop a petroleum taxation system which 
will gather the economic rent while encouraging the efficient 
exploitation of exhaustible resources 
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WHO SHOULD RECEIVE ECONOMIC RENT 
The Beneficiaries Can Be Investors, Oil Consumers-Arid·Governments·; '-::.-, •.n,,-_;.-
In the absence of legislation it is natural to assume that investors 
would receive the total amount of the economic rent. 
In some oil- producing countries oil consumers receive a share of the 
economic rent in the form of reduced prices. 
The exploitation of petroleum normally requires the provision of a 
relevant infrastructure and government will usually be involved in the 
financing of this infrastructure. It is argued therefore that the tier' of · 
government that is responsible for providing the. infrastructure has a .. 
corresponding claim to the reserves. Also ·,petroleum is a depleting 
resource and as production diminishes, the local population could 
become less able to sustain the burden of providing· local• public 
goods. If the state had to provide the infrastructure relating to the • ·' ,·. ·' • ... 
exploitation of the resource, the government is entitled to a ·sh'are of 
the economic rent. 
TYPES OF RENT/TAX COLLECTING SYSTEMS 
The Marais technical committee on mining taxation reported on the 
effects of different taxing systems as follows; 
Royalties and Productions Taxes 
• The conventional fiscal devices imposed on oil exploitation 
activities can produce various types of distortions. The most 
traditional form of impost has been the royalty; this has 
traditionally constituted the reward of the landlord for allowing 
exploitation of a resource which he owns. 
• In a situation where the investor has no control over the market 
price of his product, conventional royalties and other production-
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based levies can cause marginal fields to be uneconomic, and can 
also lead to fields being prematurely abandoned. Conventional 
royalties and production levies are obviously not well related to -
profits and so the danger of such distortions emerges. 
• As profitability of exploitation falls due to lower oil prices or higher 
exploitation costs, a traditional flat-rate royalty of production tax 
will take an increasing share of gross profits. In an extreme 
situation payments have to be made when zero or negative profits 
are being earned. 
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• Because obligation to pay royalties or production tax commences 
with first production, the burden of these imposts in present-value 
terms is increased compared with other taxes, · liability for which -- · -. ,,-. 
does not commence so early in field life. It follows .that in present- __ _ 
value terms the burden of production-based levies is higher than 
for payments of total comparable size which commence later in 
field life. The early commencement of liability also increases the 
share of such payments in the economic rents from field 
production. When a field becomes marginal the burden· of front-
end royalty or production-tax payments can readily make a project 
sub-marginal. -I 
• When profitability of exploitation increases due to rising oil prices · 
or unexpectedly low costs, the share of a flat-rate royalty or 
production tax in gross profits falls. Similarly, the share of 
economic rents extracted falls. Traditional royalties are thus crude 
devices which are comparatively insensitive to changes in realised 
economic rents emanating from oil-price movements or "Cost'"'•·· , 
variations. In other words flat-rate royalties and production taxes 
are not efficient instruments with which to collect economic rents. 
• Investor will generally cease production from a field when net 
profits turn negative, and the existence of proquction-based leyies 
can accelerate the timing of this decision. As production -Jalls, 
exploitation costs eventually exceed revenues; the field is 
abandoned when marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue. 
Production-based levies form a wedge between gross revenues 
and exploitation costs. The requirement of an additional payment 
based on revenues means that marginal cost exceeds the net 
price at a higher level of output. 
• The field will be abandoned earlier than would otherwise be the 
case and resources, the exploitation of which is in the national 
interest, will remain in the ground. For this reason provisions for 
royalty relief exists in the regulations of many countries. 
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• From the point of view of host governments, royalties and 
production taxes have some obvious advantages. Early revenues 
are attractive to all governments, and the likelihood'·-of these·= .,, --- · 
continuing throughout field life is also appealing. The., costs of 
monitoring and administering royalties are also less than those for 
other fiscal devices. 
Corporate Income Tax 
• The effects of conventional income taxes on ·· petroleum 
investments depend upon the rate of tax and the. provisions· 
regarding depreciation, loss offsetting, and any other tillowances in· 
the system. The timing of the recovery of investment costs 
affects the effective burden of the tax because the present value 
of tax liability is reduced. 
• The facility to offset the costs of new exploration· and development 
against other existing income by postponing ·,payments: ·of ·tax 1 '' , , ,,·,r,,- ,-,,.. '·' 1 
reduces the effective costs of developing new fields. · In most· 
countries income tax is levied on a company's nationwide 
activities; so if the legislation permits allowances to be utilised as 
soon as expenditure is incurred, the investor obtains a , useful 
incentive. 
• In some jurisdictions ring-fence provisions prevail whereby income-
tax assessments are made on a field-by-field or contract-area 
basis. Indonesia is such a case - a separate company is required 
for each contract area and no group relief is permitted. This 
increases the net cost of undertaking new exploration and 
development work. 
• The legislation concerning utilisation of allowances reflects the 
extent to which government is sharing in the investment risks. 
When exploration and development allowances can be set against 
other income as soon as expenditure is incurred, the government is 
sharing in the investment risks to a considerable extent. This is 
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the main example of loss offsetting being permitted. _If the new 
expenditure does not generate taxable profits, the, government will 
have lost revenue in absolute terms; if the new expenditure is 
successful, the government will be suffering a:.·postponementiof •, , ,. , 
revenue compared with the situation under ring-fence arrangement 
or one where allowances cannot be claimed until the asset is 
placed in service. 
Special Profits-related Taxes 
• In the main North Sea producing countries (the United Kingdom, 
Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands) the governments have 
imposed special profits-related taxes which are not income taxes in 
the conventional sense. In the case of the first three countries 
they are levied on a field-by-field basis. This limits the 
government's investment risks. At the same time devices such as· 
the 'uplift' or extra relief for field capital expenditure .are included, 
in order to relate the government take to field profitability: .. 
• While in general such imposts are less likely to cause disincentives 
than are production taxes or royalties, they do carry inherent risks 
of creating distortions. The presence of an 'uplift' on capital 
outlays can ensure that the tax burden is progressively. related. to 
profits in money-of-the-day terms, but it may not do so in present-
value terms. Also, the provision of investment relieves exceeding 
1 00% of the outlays, combined with high marginal rates of tax, 
can result in a lack of cost-consciousness or the encouragement of 
'gold-plating' expenditures. 
• The given objectives of this type of tax is to collect a high share of 
economic rents while maintaining investment incentives. 
However, the tax is not directly related to field profitability (in 
present-value terms). Use of the indirect mechanism, certainly 
introduces the risk that the scheme will not ensure that 
disincentives do not emerge or that government's share of 
economic rents will be 'adequate.' 
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• These schemes have also been found to be insufficiently flexible to 
changing oil prices to fulfil their given objectives;· and discretionary · 
changes have had to be made by governments. ,_This increases··th·e· J .),.: : ,.·::::;, :1·/ •/ 
uncertainty of the investment environment. 
Special Excise Taxes 
• As a device to collect economic rents from rising oil prices, several 
governments have introduced excise-type taxes based on the 
difference between a base price and the market value. The most 
famous of these is the Windfall Profits Tax in the United States but 
others - such as the Excess Proceeds Tax in Malaysia; some forms . 
of levies employed in Australia over the last decade; anq · one 
element of the royalty scheme in Alberta - all fall into the same 
general category. 
• The basic idea behind this type of levy is that ·oil price increases 
confer windfall gains on produces, and at least a part of these 
gains can legitimately be extracted by the state. The tax may 
commence as soon as production from a field starts if the base 
price is less than the market price at the same time. This type of 
levy has several problems associated with it. . There. js a .. danger. 
that incentives to develop marginal fields will be impaired, while at 
the same time the burden on highly profitable projects will be 
comparatively light. 
• The scheme could be made more complex or sophisticated in an 
attempt to deal with these problems. This is certainly the case 
with the Windfall Profits Tax in the United States, where the rate 
of tax and the base price vary according to when the fields were 
discovered; the base price is higher for 'new' oil and the tax rate 
lower. Also, very small projects are exempt from the tax. These 
modifications can obviously provide incentives to explore, but the 
mechanism is still crude and could well not achieve its objectives. 
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• From the point of view of risk sharing, this type of tax leaves the 
exploration and field development risks with the investor~ while the 
oil price risks are shared between the investor and the- government-
when the market price exceeds the base price. The: fact that the,•·• 
tax is reduced to zero when the price falls to the base level gives 
more 'downside' protection to the investor compared with·' a , 
straight production tax. 
• In sum, it is unlikely that the excise duty levied on the difference· 
between a base and market price can extract economic rents from 
petroleum exploitation without introducing distorting effects. 
Production-Sharing Agreements 
• Though legally quite different in concept, production-sharing 
schemes have some economic features in common with an 
income-tax system. Provisions for cost recovery (both regarding 
any ceilings on the amount of oil available for this -purpo'Se and 
regarding the speed at which costs can be recovered) are akin to 
allowances for exploration, development, and operating costs .. 
The effects of different rates of recovery are essentially the- same 
as those discussed for depreciation under the income tax. 
• The overall effect of a production-sharing scheme depends on the 
share of profit oil taken by government as well as on the cost-
recovery terms. For example,' 'faster' cost recovery can 
compensate for 'high' profit oil share accruing to government. To 
obtain neutrality between different petroleum projects; the pace of 
cost recovery should be same as for economic depreciation under 
the income tax. If the ceiling on the share of production is set 
very low, the investor may not recover all his costs over the 
lifetime of the field; such a situation would be akin to the 
imposition of a royalty or production tax. 
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• An incremental production-share scheme is akin to a progressive 
income tax to the extent that differences in government income 
accrue from differences in field size. The fact that the progressive · 
scale is on an incremental basis ensures that the marginal rate' of:· 
'tax' on the investor does not exceed 100%. This reduces the 
scope for depletion decisions' being distorted by the fiscal package 
but, if marginal rates rise very steeply, situations could emerge 
where it would pay the investor to deplete fields more slowly. 
• The production-sharing system is not geared to deal well with the 
situation of unexpected changes in economic rents emanating from 
oil price changes. If the price of oil doubles, the profitability to the 
investor of a given share of oil would increase considerably; but 
the fiscal package would not react automatically· in such a way as 
to give the government a large share of such a windfall. 
• If a government adopts a standard form of production-sharing 
contract throughout its jurisdiction, it might well find that a given . 
structure is appropriate for one area but not· for another. A, 
government could vary the terms from one part of the country to 
another, but this increases the complexity of the . regulatory 
package and probably increases the uncertainty of the investment 
environment. 
• Production-sharing contracts are no.rmally designed effectively on a 
ring-fence basis though the term as such may not 'be employed. 
Typically, the exploration and development costs incurred in a 
contract area may be set against revenues only from the same 
area. 
• Production-sharing contracts leave the contractor to take the risks 
at the exploration and development phases. The government 
does, however, have an interest in ensuring that these costs are 
kept to a minimum, because the lower they are the more oil will be 
available for sharing purposes. When production commences the 
risks are shared between the two parties. 
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• In sum, production-sharing contracts, · especially .those 
incorporating incremental arrangements for profit oil splitting, :have 
some advantages over traditional schemes of royalty;.and, incomeJ'. ;,,,,,:u1,;'., .. 
tax. A given scheme can ensure that governments automatically 
obtain a high share of the economic rents accruing from fields of 
many different sizes. If a government is risk-ave·rse, the 
production-sharing scheme also has attractions. 
• On the other hand this form of agreement cannot ensure that 
changes in economic rents emanating from changes in the oil price 
(either upward or downward) will automatically be reflected in 
changes in government take. 
• Further, a given, single scheme may not be appropriate for fields 
with large differences in costs. 
The Brown Tax 
• Because of the imperfections of all the conventional fiscal devices 
discussed above, economists have proposed the ·use of other fiscal 
instruments in an attempt to obtain a distortion-free mechanism by 
which economic rents can be collected. The two which. have._, 
found most favour are the 'Brown Tax' and the resource rent tax. 
• The 'Brown Tax' is based on corporation net cash flows. All 
exploration, development, and operating costs are recoverable on 
1 00% first-year basis. There are no ring-fence provisions and so 
all expenditures on new activities can immediately be set' against 
existing income. 
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• In effect the government subsidises exploration and development 
activities (entailing negative cash flows) at the same (flat) rate that 
is subsequently applied to positive cash flows frnm petroleum 
exploitation. Where the investor has no existing income, against ':; 't ,~ , ., ~ ._,., 1 
which to set off expenditures it incurs, the government actually 
pays a share of the costs to the extent of the tax rate. _,. 
• This tax, very simple in concept, is neutral in the sense that the 
post tax rate of return is not less than the pre-tax one (though 
post-tax net present values will generally be less than pre-tax 
values). 
• The scheme shares project risks with government to such a large 
extent that, statistically, the dispersion of the distribution of 
outcomes facing investors from new projects is actually reduced. 
This major 'shifting' of investment risk may well be unacceptable 
to some governments. 
• No tax would be payable if no commercial discovery were made or 
if exploitation were unprofitable, and the financing of the 
government's share of costs may prove difficult, especially in Third 
World countries. 
• In general the tax has many attractions, not only because of its 
neutrality, but also because of the comparative ease of obtaining a 
distortion-free scheme which is automatically adaptable to 
changing circumstances in the operating environment. 
• The scheme taxes only economic rents, but there 1s no 
complicated procedure required by legislators to determine or 
define rents; for example, no knowledge is required of the 
investor's discount rate. 
Resource Rent Tax 
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• Probably because of the requirement on governments to become 
full sharers in the front-end investment risks, the 'Brown Tax' has 
not been popular among governments. 
• The resource rent tax has been found more acceptable to 
legislators. In essence this tax allows the investor to achieve a 
specified {discounted) threshold rate of return on a project before 
tax becomes payable. The threshold rate of interest is used to 
compound forward the investor's net cash flow, commencing with 
initial exploration; the accumulated total becomes a larger and 
larger negative figure until production commences; and the .. 
compounding process continues until the accumulated total 
becomes positive. The resource rent tax is then levied and 
continues to be levied on positive annual net cash flows. 
• In principle the threshold rate should represent the investor's 
discount rate. If this rate is employed, then the tax should not 
discourage 
discovered. 
investment 1n fields which have• • already been 
Unfortunately, different investors may· employ 
different rates, and any one investor could legitimately employ 
several, with the chosen one depending on the perceived risks of· 
the project in question. 
• Further, investors will generally not reveal their discount. rates to 
governments. Governments will therefore have to estimate 
discount rates. If they use rates that are below those employed by 
investors, projects will be discouraged; if they employ rates higher 
than those employed by investors, governments would end up 
with a lower share of the economic rents than could have been 
obtained with full knowledge. 
• If investors' threshold rates are accurately reflected in those 
enacted in legislation, then economic rents from discovered fields 
can be collected without disincentives emerging. 
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• Marginal field developments, too, would not be impaired. The 
system would be highly sensitive to fluctuations ir:i oil prices and to 
ranges of exploitation costs and field sizes. It would automatically 
react in such a way as to increase government take when 
profitability increases, from whatever source, and to· reduce 
government take when profitability falls. The sensitivity .would be : . 
strong enough to ensure that government would always obtain an 
'adequate' share of the economic rents while field developments 
would never be deterred when they were viable on a pre-tax basis. 
• From the investor's view point the resource rent tax has the 
advantage that capital investment risks are shared with 
government to a greater extent than under conventional tax 
systems: until the threshold rate of return is attained: no tax. is 
payable; this does not happen with conventional taxes. 
• Risk sharing is unlikely to be as great as it is with the 'Brown Tax,' 
however, because the resource rent tax is likely to be levied ,on a. 
contract-area or project basis, not on a company-wide basis. 
Thus, the investor still has to bear all the initial exploration and 
development risks prior to production from the project i.n question. 
• Resource rent tax schemes can have one or,, more. tiers, ,with: 
positive tax rates. Under a multi-.tier scheme the system is. 
progressively related to rates of return. When several tiers exist, 
care has to be taken to ensure that over investment or 'gold""· 
plating' incentives are not introduced. In general the danger of 
such distortions emerging is greater the jump from one threshold· 
rate to the next and the greater the increase in tax rates from one 
tier to the next. 
• When exploration risks are brought into the picture, it becomes 
clear that a resource rent tax could produce disincentive effects at 
the exploration stage of petroleum exploitation activities. Investors 
base exploration decisions on calculations of expected monetary 
values which take into account the probability of discoveries being 
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made. A resource rent tax system, while it might not deter the 
development of discovered fields that were viable on a . pre-tax 
basis, could still deter exploration. Expected monetary values 
could be positive on a pre-tax basis and negative pcrst-tax: ·.; ,::J,: en ':, cr,0: , r'..;~•;;c.; ,i, 
• The danger of this occurring increases as the probability·of rnaking 
discoveries falls, because the resource rent tax as normally 
specified does not share in the risks of failure to make commercial 
discoveries. If the scheme is on a project or contract-are basis, 
there is no provision for write-off of unsuccessful exploration. It 
has thus to be recognised that a resource rent tax· could reduce . 
exploration. It should be emphasised, however, that this type of 
disincentive is present with all conventional tax and royalty 
schemes. 
Bidding Systems 
• Bidding systems can take various forms, Cash·--borius bi_ds are the: 
most common in the United States and Alberta. They are lump-
sum payments made at the time the leases are off~red. Other 
possible forms include royalty bidding, and work-program bidding. · 
•• ':.J 
The competitive bonus-bidding system favoured in,. the, United__;,,,_,·, _,, ••.11: ,, __ ! ,; 1,~; ,. 
States and Canada is frequently advocated because it. should not · 
produce any distortions. It is argued that, if there is a high degree 
of competition in bidding for the rights to exploit petroleum, the 
size of the bonus bids should reflect the expected economic rents. 
In effect the interested investors will estimate the Expected 
Monetary Value (EMV) from the prospect on offer, discount future 
costs and revenues at their own discount rates, and make their 
own estimates of the probability of success at the exploration 
phase. The bids thus reflect the investors' perception of the 
prospects and their own discount rates, rather than the 
perceptions of outside parties such as host governments. 
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• Despite the obvious attractions there are problems associated with 
the widespread application of a bonus-bidding system. . A high 
degree of competition among bidders is required; collusion among 
investors could thwart the effective operation of the· system. The· 
dangers of collusion are less the greater the number of bidders, but 
in many countries the number of investors interested in acquiring 
blocs put on offer can be very small. In some Third World 
countries they have been many cases of only one investor (or two 





In the previous chapters we have examined the . need. for inter-a,/ia .. --
South Africa to promote the exploration and subsequent exploitation 
of its potential reserves the establishment of a general petroleum 
policy and different contractual basis to achieve its petroleum 
objectives. In this chapter we will examine the contractural basis that 
South Africa has chosen for the exploration of its natural oil as well as -
the income tax on the income earned from such activities. 
Introduction 
S0EK0R was formed in 1965 by the State which .it wholly owns:with 
the purpose of exploring the potential of South Africa's natural oil 
resources and to exploit them either on their own or preferably in 
conjunction with private investors. 
S0EK0R was given the legal right to do the prospecting for natural oil 
both onshore of South Africa and within the territorial waters of South 
Africa. Since its conception the accent switched from the land to the . 
sea and in spite of some known oil occurrences on land it is clear that 
if we are to make a substantial oil discovery it will be offshore.' So far·-
over eighty-three holes have been drilled offshore and an amount of 
excess of R450 million has been spent by S0EK0R and an amount of 
in excess of R 110 million by other companies. These numbers 
exclude the costs of developing the Mossgas Project. This figure is 
estimated to be in the sum of R15 billion. 
Legal Mechanism for the Granting of Exploration Rights in South 
Africa 
The grantrng of prospecting and mining leases at the time that 
S0EK0R received its prospecting rights was regulated in terms of the 
Mining Rights Act, No 20 of 1 967. That act has since been repealed 
and substituted by Act 50 of 1 991 the Mining Rights Act. The effect 
of certain portions, which are relevant to the Prospecting Lease 
granted to SOEKOR and the Mining Lease grar:ited to Mossgas, are 
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however unaffected by it as a consequence of an amendment made 
to the 1 991 Act which was specifically introduced to preserve the 
rights contained in the prospecting lease granted to SOEKOR and the 
mining lease granted to Mossgas. 
The Mining Act provides for the award of a prospecting lease which 
entitles the grantee thereof the right to prospect for natural oil and in 
the event of a successful find the subsequent right to apply for and 
the grant of a mining lease for that area. In essence then a 
prospecting lease contains a) the right to prospect and b) the 
subsequent right to mining should a quantity of oil be found which 
justifies exploitation. 
SOEKOR was in terms of the Mining Act granted a prospecting lease 
which covered the area consisting of the whole of the land of the 
Republic of South Africa, commonly referred to as OP29 and a 
prospecting lease for the exploration of oil within the territorial 
waters of South Africa - commonly referred to as OP26. 
Clause 14 of the Mining Rights Act of 1967 in terms of which OP26 
was granted to SOEKOR (a similar clause is contained in the 1991 
Act) provides; 
"Prospecting leases for natural oil. 
1. The Minister may -
a) by notice in the Gazette and in one or more newspapers 
circulating in the area in which any land is situated call 
for tenders for a prospecting lease over such land in 
respect of natural oil, and may grant such a prospecting 
lease on such conditions as he may subject to the 
succeeding provisions of this section determine to any 
tenderer who satisfies him -
(i) that the scheme according to which the tenderer 
proposes to prospect for natural oil upon such land 
is satisfa_ctory; and 
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(ii) either that his financial resources are adequate for 
proper prospecting under such a lease or that the, 
arrangements by which he proposes to obtain 
capital for the purpose are satisfactory; or 
b) without calling for such tenders grant such a prospecting 
lease on such conditions as he may subject to the 
provisions of this section determine over any such land in 
respect of natural oil to any person applying therefor who 
so satisfies him. 
2. The minister shall, before granting or refusing any leas~ under 
subsection ( 1), submit every tender or application for the lease 
to the Board for its report." 
An interesting prov1s1on 1s contained in article 14 (3) of the 
mining Rights Act of 1967 - which was not in turn incorporated 
into the 1991 Act, which reads -
3. "Any lease under subsection (1) may embody any terms and 
conditions agreed upon in consultation with any other Minister 
on matters falling within the purview of a department of State 
administered by such other Minister and shall provide -
a) for the scale on which and the manner in which 
prospecting operations shall be carried on; 
b) for the supply to the Minister, at such times as may be 
specified in the lease, of full statements describing the 
nature of the prospecting operations which have been 
carried out and the site and depth of any borehole and 
the formations penetrated, and containing such other 
. information as the Minister may require; 
c) for the keeping by the prospector of records relating to 
the operations; 
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d) or the inspection or examination by the Minister, or any 
person authorised thereto by him, of such records and of 
the lease area and of any substance (including borehole 
cores) brought to the surface in the course of such 
operations; and 
e) or the payment by the holder of the lease to the owner 
and any person entitled to use the surface of any land 
included in the lease area, who suffers any surface 
damage or any damage to crops or improvements on 
such land caused by the exercise by the holder of the 
lease of his rights under the lease, or by any act or 
omission incidental thereto, of compensation for such 
damage. 
and may further embody any or all of the terms and conditions 
(including terms and conditions agreed upon in the manner aforesaid) 
which will be applicable to any mining lease to which the tender or 
applicant for the prospecting lease may become entitled under section 
25 ( 1) (g) on the land in question, and any terms and conditions shall 
for the purposes of this act be deemed to have been recommended by 
the board and shall not withstanding anything in any law contained be 
binding upon the State." 
It is believed that the insertion of this clause which enables the 
Minister of Mines to agree with any other Minister on matters which 
in effect, would if any agreement is reached between them override 
any other legislation pertaining to the particular portfolios for which 
they are Ministers responsible for, was regarded as necessary in order 
to develop a prospecting lease which could be packaged in such a 
way as to encourage investment in this important energy sector of the 
country. Such an approach gave the prospecting lease a degree of 
flexibility, and the prospective investor certainty as to the fiscal and 
other parameters affecting his investment. This attribute is desirable 
when one considers the high degree of risk that is inherent in 
prospecting for oil. 
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In practice it has been shown that even greater flexibility exists than 
what is stated above. At the time of the granting of Mossgas Lease, 
SOEKOR after having prospected in terms of OP26Jor twenty years 
were of the view that the circumstances had changed in various 
respects and also that there were certain unsatisfactory elements· 
within the wording of OP26 which justified amendment. The Minister 
of Mines and the Minister of Finance both showed a willingness to· re- · 
negotiate certain of the terms of the prospecting lease and the mining 
lease to accommodate those issues which they believed had merit .. In 
essence, therefore, the prospecting lease should be regarded as the 
complete framework against which the investor can make his decision . 
but sight must not be lost of the fact that the Minister of Mines and · 
the Minister of Finance have shown a willingness to accommodate 
investors by altering the terms of the prospecting lease. 
As was stated above the Mining Right Act of 1991 did not include a 
clause equivalent to Section 14 (3) which immediately raised the 
question of whether those provisions which .. conflicted, with any 
existing legislation were valid in law. This resulted in the·,amendment · ,. , .. ;; :,,.s:; · ,i;: 
to that act which in effect preserved the position of the Mossgas 
lease and the SOEKOR OP26 by virtue of the amendment to Section· 
44 of Act 50 of 1991, which reads as follows - "Section 44 of the, 




The provision of the Mining Rights Act, 1 967, in relation 
to the granting of a mining lease for natural oil in terms 
of section 25 ( 1) (g) of the said Act and any other matter 
in connection therewith shall, notwithstanding the repeal 
of the said Act by section 68( 1), remain in force until the 
last existing prospecting lease granted in terms of section 
14 mentioned in subsection (a) (a) (ii) has lapsed in 
accordance with subsection ( 1 )(b). 
Any mining right granted or acquired by virtue of 
paragraph (a) or any share in such right shall, 
notwithstanding the repeal of the Mining Rights Act, 





terms and conditions under which it was granted or 
acquired or deemed to have been granted or acquired 
and which are contained in the document concerned. 
The provisions of Section 47(1)(f) and (2) shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to a mining right referred to in 
paragraph (b). 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in 
any law, agreement, authorisation or approval, no mining 
right referred to in paragraph (b) shall be ceded, 
transferred, let, sublet, tributed, subdivided, amended or 
mortgaged, either wholly or as to a part of parts, without 
the approval of the Minister granted in terms of this 
paragraph. 
For the purposes of this act the holder of any mining 
right referred to in paragraph (b) or his successor in title 
shall, in relation to such mining right, be deemed to be 
the holder of - (i) the right to the mineral concerned in 
respect of the land concerned; and (ii) a mining 
authorisation". 
Mining Tax Provisions Of The Income Tax Act 
Before examining the fiscal provisions of the OP26 the taxation 
provisions of the Income Tax Act will be set out briefly this will be 
useful when one examines the provisions of OP26 to see how the 
provisions of the Mining Act have been deviated from in order to 
provide a more favourable result for , the investor exploring for oil 
' 
within the territorial waters of South Africa. 
Taxable income derived from the carrying on of mmmg operations 
must be determined in accordance with the ordinary provisions of the 
Act, subject, in particular, to the special provisions contained in 
subsection 1 5 (2A), 15,36 and 37 of the Act. These special 
provisions provide for: 
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Excess recoupments of capital expenditure (para (j) of the 
definition of the terms "gross income" in s 1 ). 
Section 5. (2A) provides for the basic rate plus the maximum 
levy of 40% as well as for the reduction of the levy to or by 
such an amount and on such conditions, as the Minister of 
Mineral and Energy Affairs in consultation with the Minister of 
Finance may determine. 
The deduction of contributions to a qualifying institution 
carrying out the environmental rehabilitation of mining land by a 
taxpayer engaged in mining, prospecting, quarrying or similar 
operations ( 11 (hA)). 
The deduction of capital expenditure from income derived by 
the taxpayer from mining operations (subsection 15 (a) and 
36). 
The deduction of expenditure incurred on prospecting 
operations from income derived by the taxpayer from mining 
operations (Section 15 (b)). 
In certain circumstances dividends declared by companies 
mining for natural oil are exempt from the non-resident 
shareholders' tax in terms of Section 42 (2) (e). 
Other special provisions relating to mining operations are 
contained in: 
Section 9 ( 1) • (cA), which provides that an amount will be 
deemed to have accrued from a source within the Republic if it 
has been received by or has accrued to or in favour of a person 
by virtue of a contract made by that person for the disposal of 
any mineral (including natural oil) won by him in the course of 
mining operations carried on by him under a mining lease 
granted under the Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967, wherever the 
contract was made or the mining operations were carried on. 
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Section 9 ( 1) (fA), which provides that an amount will be 
deemed to have accrued form a source within the Republic if it 
has been ·received by or has accrued to or in favour of a person 
by virtue of any services rendered by that person to - or work 
or labour done by that person for - any other person upon, 
beneath or above the continental shelf referred to in Section 7 
of the Territorial Waters Act 87 of 1963 in the course of 
operations connected with operations carried on by any person 
under a prospecting or mining lease granted or that may be 
granted under the Mining Rights Act or under any sublease 
granted or that may be granted under any such lease, wherever 
payment for the services or work or labour is or is to be made 
Section 18A, which provides a special basis for the deduction 
of qualifying donations made to universities, colleges or 
educational funds of the Bible Society of South Africa by 
companies carrying on mining operations. 
Mining operations are eligible for most of the appropriate 
deductions provided for by the Act. Nevertheless, the no 
longer available initial and the still current annual allowances on 
industrial buildings may not be claimed for buildings used in the 
course of the trade of mining (subsection 13 ( 1) and (7); the 
riow terminated 11 50/30/20 11 depreciation is unavailable on 
machinery and plant used for the purposes of the trade of 
mining (Section 12B) and · so is its replacement, 
11 20/20/20/20/20 11 depreciation · (Section 1 2C); and the 
benefaction allowance may not be claimed in the context of 
mining operations or operations normally carried on in the 
course of such operations. 
In terms of Section 42 (2) (E) of the Income Tax Act non-
resident shareholders tax on dividends distributed out of taxable 
income from natural oil mining is not subject to NRST. 
Although not relevant for the purposes of comparing the provisions of 
the Income Tax Act with the _provision of OP26 it may be useful to 
distinguish between a speculator in mineral rights and a miner of 
mineral rights. 
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A speculator is one who engages on exploration in order to earn 
income from the disposal of any rights to mining: for the oil which he , 
may receive on discovering the oil. A miner earns, income from the 
disposal of the oil itself. 
Exploration Expenses Incurred by a Speculator 
Exploration expenses incurred by a speculator will be deductible in 
. terms of Section 11 {a) as it is expenditure incurred for the purposes 
of producing income from the disposal of the Oil Mining Rights which 
may result from the exploration. Such income will of course be 
taxable falling within the definition of gross income. 
Strictly speaking, because the speculator regards his mineral rights as 
trading stock {see Section 22), this trading stock must valued and the 
value brought into income at the close of each year. 
If there is no income from the disposal of mineral rights in the· tax 
year that the exploration expenditure is incurred, then an assessed 
loss is created which can be carried forward to a future year or years 
where income is earned. 
Exploration Expenses Incurred by a Miner 
Exploration cost incurred prior to a mining lease being granted are 
deductible. However, it is only deductible from mining income, 
therefore, the deduction would have to wait until income is derived 
from mining. The expenditure cannot be offset against other non-
mining income. 
Exploration costs incurred in an area where a mining lease has been 
granted are not deductible as it does not fall within the ambit of 
Section { 1 5) {b) nor does it fall within the definition of capital 
expenditure in Section 36. The expenditure can therefore only be 
deducted in terms Section 11 {a) this is considered unlikely. Capital 
expenditure is not deductible in terms of Section 11 {a) and, in view 
of the enduring benefits test, the expenditure in seeking further 
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mi17eral deposits would probably be regarded as capital expenditure 
that is more closely associated with the income earning structure 
rather than an expense incurred in the income earning operation. 
The disadvantage of this is that the exploration expenditure can be 
incurred over a lengthily period and in the interim, until a commercial 
deposit is discovered and income is derived therefrom, there is no 
deduction. If no commercial discovery is ever made the expenditure 
will never be deductible. 
A payment to compensate a predecessor in title for past exploration 
expenditure ought to acquire Mineral Rights is not deductible from 
mining income. 
For this reason companies seek to deduct the expenditure under 
Section 11 (a) of the Income Tax Act rather than under section 1 5 
(b). They do this by classifying themselves as traders in mineral 
rights. Mineral rights are stock in trade, the sale of which give rise to 
a non-mining income. The expenditure in acquiring those rights is 
therefore incurred for the purposes of producing income and is thus 
deductible in terms of section 11 (a). The advantage of having the 
deduction in terms of Section 11 (a) rather than Section 1 5 (b) is that 
the expenditure can be settled against any income and not mining 
income. 
If there is no discovery the exploration costs will have been deducted 
from other income and the objective has been achieved. 
If there is a discovery the mineral rights must be sold to another 
group company which will exploit those rights. The income from the 
sale will constitute income which will be taxable as a recoupment 
thus effectively wiping out the effect of deducting the expenses 
ignoring (the time value of money). The purchaser will be allowed in 
terms of Section 37 ( 1) to deduct the cost of these so called 
development assets by virtue of them forming part of the capital 
expenditure incurred in Section 36 ( 11). 
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Should, therefore, a mining lease be issued to a tax payer it would. be 
imperative, in determining his tax status, what his intention was. Is 
he a trader in natural oil Mining rights or a miner under those rights:·. 
We shall now turn to examine the fiscal conditions of OP26. 
Fiscal Provisions of OP26 
An examination will now be had of the fiscal provisions of OP26. It is 
not the purpose of this minor dissertation to examine the contents of 
OP26 in its entirety. 
This prospecting lease which also includes the terms of the mining 
lease was granted to SOEKOR on 23 June 1967 but has just prior to 
the granting of a mining lease to Mossgas (Pty) Ltd in 1990 been 
amended after negotiations between SOEKOR and the relevant 
Ministers. The principal clause dealing with taxation and the 
calculation thereof is contained in Clause 23, which is re-stated here 
for ease of reference purposes; 
"23·. Except to the extent exempted, SOEKOR shall throughout the 
term of this Mining Lease be liable for income tax payments to 
the State on the annual taxable income derived by it from the 
mining of natural oil in accordance with the Income Tax Act of 
the Republic of South Africa as amended from time to time but 
such tax, however, shall not exceed in respect of taxable 
income derived during any year of assessment from the mining 
of natural oil in the mining block, the sum of -
23. 1 an amount of tax (hereinafter called the 'basic tax') 
calculated on the full amount of such taxable income at 
the rates applicable under the Income Tax Act to taxable 
income derived by a company from mining. 
23.2 an amount of tax calculated on the balance of such 
taxable income remaining after the deduction therefrom 
the 'basic tax', at the rate of -
74 ... 
23.3. 
23.2. 1 20% (twenty percent) if the total amount of the 
taxable income derived by SOEKOR from the 
mining of natural oil in the mining block during 
the years of assessment preceding the year of 
assessment in respect of which the income tax 
is payable, does not exceed an amount equal to 
the direct capital development costs incurred by 
SOEKOR in respect of the mining block, as 
determined in terms of sub-clause 23.3 hereof, 
or if SOEKOR has not derived any such taxable 
income during the said preceding years of 
assessment; or 
23.2.2 30% (thirty percent) if the said total amount of 
taxable income exceeds an amount equal to the 
said direct capital development costs, but does 
not exceed an amount equal to twice direct 
capital development costs; or 
23.2.3 40% (forty percent) if the said total amount of 
taxable income exceeds an amount equal to 
twice the said direct capital development costs. 
For the purposes of this Clause 23 the direct capital 
development costs incurred by SOEKOR in respect of the 
mining block shall be deemed to be the sum of -
23. 3. 1 any expenditure actually incurred by SOE KOR 
itself in prospecting for natural oil in the mining 
block as well as in transactions in connection 
therewith excluding the costs of mineral or 
mining rights and land prior to the 
commencement of mining operations therein ; 
and 
23.3.2 such expenditure actually incurred by SOEKOR 
itself in developing the mining block prior to the 
date of completing the development programme 
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for the production of natural oil from the mining 
block on a commercial sale, as in terms of the 
Income Tax Act is included in capital ,, r," 
expenditure ranking for deduction from rncome 
derived by SOEKOR itself from mining for natural 
oil in the mining block. 
23.4 The date referred to in sub-clause 23.3.2 hereof shall be 
such date as may be agreed upon between SOEKOR and 
the Commissioner for Inland Revenue or, in the absence 
of such agreement, as may be fixed by the Government 
Mining Engineer having regard to the circumstances: 
23.5 SOEKOR shall maintain a permanent establishment in the 
Republic of South Africa and arrange its affairs in such a 
manner that all the profits from mining for natural oil 
under this Mining Lease will be attributable to that 
establishment. 
23.6 Any payments to the State in terms of Clause 23 hereof, 
shall constitute SOEKOR's only commitment to the State, 
or any political sub-division thereof, for taxes or levies on 
the income derived by SOEKOR from the mining of 
natural oil and SOEKOR shall not be liable for: 
23.6.1 any other taxes or levies of a similar nature, 
calculated in relation to taxable income; profits 
or turnover arising out of SOEKOR's operations 
in the mining and disposal of natural oil under 
this Mining Lease; 
23.6.2 any share of profit by the State, any royalty or 
any other form of lease consideration in respect 
of the activities performed by it pursuant, to this 
Mining Lease; 
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23.6.3 non-resident shareholders' tax or any other 
dividend withholding tax, in respect of dividends 
declared or paid in favour of shareholders who 
are not resident in the Republic of South Africa 
out of profits derived from the mining of natural 
oil, or any tax on the remittance outside the 
Republic of South Africa of profits derived from 
the mining of natural oil; or 
23. 6.4 undistributed profits tax in respect of profits 
derived from mining for natural oil. 
23. 7 In calculating the taxable income referred to in Clause 23 
hereof, the deductions from income shall be as laid down 
in the Income Tax Act, provided that such deductions 
shall not be less favourable that those allowed under the 
Income Tax Act, as at the date on which the 1977 
amendments thereto were promulgated, and shall in any 
event include -
23. 7 .1 under current working costs, also the cost of 
transportation of natural oil from the mining 
block to the marine terminal or the local refinery, 
as the case may be; and 
23. 7 .2 as· capital expenditure ranking for redemption -
a) the costs of laying pipelines from the 
mining block to the points referred to in 
sub-sub-clause 23. 7 .1 above or to the 
onshore processing facility of SOEKOR 
contemplated in sub-clause 13.5 hereof; 
b) the costs expended by SOEKOR itself on 
prospecting operations within the area 
covered by the mining block in any tax 
year or part thereof prior to the date of 
granting of this Mining Lease; 
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c) the costs incurred by SOEKOR itself in 
connection with the viability of the 
relevant undertaking and the design, 
procurement, management (including also 
project management), transport and 
construction of the constituent parts (from 
and after raw material stage and including 
also the piles and other foundations) of 
any marine or onshore receiving 
installations erected or to be erected on 
the mining block or onshore with a view 
to exploitation of the natural oil discovered 
or found in the mining block, including 
also the costs of training of personnel for 
any purpose in connection with such 
installation, at any time prior to the 
successful commissioning of such 
installations but excluding any assets 
belonging to another taxpayer; and 
d) a capital allowance equal to· 1 2 % (twelve 
percent) compound interest per annum on 
the total amount of unredeemed capital 
expenditure, ranking for redemption, 
calculated from the end of the month 
during which such cost was incurred, until 
it be redeemed and calculated, as far as 
this can be done, according to the 
provisions of section 26(3) and (4) of the 
Mining Rights Act, 1 967, an example of 
which is attached hereto as Annexure I. 
23.8 Expenditure shall not be disallowed as a deduction from 
income for income tax purposes merely because it has 
been incurred by SOEKOR outside the Republic of South 
Africa. 
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23.9 Mining activities taking place in or in connection with an 
area or areas covered by one Mining Lease and its 
associated pipelines and onshore receiving installations 
up to the boundary of the local refinery, if any, shall be 
deemed to have taken place in respect of a single mine 
provided that assets belonging to another taxpayer will 
be disregarded. 
23.10 In the event of SOEKOR making a discovery of natural oil 
or a discovery in workable quantities and this Mining 
Lease being granted in respect thereof, there shall be 
deducted in each year of assessment throughout the 
continuation of this Mining Lease from the amount of tax 
calculated in accordance with the foregoing provisions of 
this Clause 23, an amount equal to 50% of so much of 
such tax as is relatable to taxable income derived from 
the disposal of natural oil from the mining block, provided 
that this deduction shall apply only with regard to the 
first Mining Lease granted in respect of waters up to 200 
metres in depth and another two with regard to the first 
two Mining Leases granted in respect of waters of more 
than 200 metres in depth. 
23.11 The amount of tax payable in terms of the preceding sub-
clause of this Clause 23 shall be reduced to or by such 
an amount and subject to such provisions ·as the Minister 
of Economic Affairs and Technology, in consultation with 
the Minister of Finance, may determine. 
23. 12 In determining the taxable income in respect of the block, 
the prospecting, development and exploitation activities 
shall be taxed as set out in this Clause 23. 
23.13 Should SOEKOR's offshore facilities be linked to an 
onshore plant also belonging to SOEKOR, the offshore 
facilities and pipelines as well as the onshore receiving 
facilities and pipelines (as well as all related structures 
and foundations) up to the boundary of the onshore plant 
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will be regarded as a mine and the income there from 
taxed as herein set out, while the rest of the onshore 
facilities will be regarded as a factory and the" income,, · 
there from taxed in accordance with the income tax laws . 
of the Republic of South Africa as amended from time to 
time, the gross income of SOEKOR from the combined 
mine and factory being deemed to have originated from 
the mine and the factory respectively being in such 
proportion as SOEKOR and the Cornmissioner for Inland 
Revenue agree or, failing such agreement, as determined 
by any of the firms or entities referred to in Annexure 2 
hereof at the request of the Commissioner, unless 
SOEKOR and the said Commissioner agree on another 
firm or entity. 
23. 14 Should SOEKOR {Eiendoms) Beperk be exempted from 
paying normal income tax, it shall exercise its rights 
herein through an affiliate, nominee, cessionary· or 
assignee which is subject to such tax, which affiliate, 
nominee, cessionary or assignee shall be taxed in 
accordance with the Clause 23." 
It may be felt that the wording of Clause 23 speaks for itself but I will 
make comments on each of the clauses ad seriatem; 
Section 23 in its entirety sets an upper limit on the tax that 
SOEKOR is to pay. 
Section 23. 1 through to Section 23.2.3 provides a reduction to the 
provisional normal tax that is provided in Section 5 (2) (A) {a) of 
the Tax Act cited above by substituting it depending on the extent 
to which the taxable income exceeds the direct capital 
development costs and could be either 20%, 30% or 40%. 
In effect the Mining Operations of SOEKOR will be taxed on the 
taxable income from natural oil (which include crude oil and gas) at 
the rates applicable to mining income. To this however, will be 
added the special levy which is similar to the additional normal tax 
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referred to in Section 5 (2A) (a) but at rates which are capable of 
being less than 40% described in the aforesaid Section 5 (2A) (a) 
in that it can be 40%, 30% or 20% depending on the extent that 
taxable income exceeds the direct capital costs incurred by 
SOEKOR. This, therefore, represents a fiscal advantage that is not 
available outside of the lease (i.e. it is not catered for in the Tax 
Act to such an extent). 
, . Although Section 23 reads that SOEKOR will be liable for income 
tax payments to the State on the annual taxable income derived by 
it from the mining of natural oil in accordance with Income Tax Act 
of the Republic of South Africa as amended from time to time .... " 
One must read this together with Section 32.1 which reads; 
"The Mining Lease throughout the period of its existence, shall be 
governed by and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the 
Republic of South Africa respectively in force on the date the 
1977 amendments to the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act 58 of 1962), 
as promulgated, and by such further laws as maybe passed in 
addition to or in substitution of them, provided such further laws 
shall not adversely affect the rights and obligations of SOEKOR." 
When taking into account the provisions of this Clause 32, it is 
clear that although Clause 23 subjects one to tax in accordance 
with the Income Tax Act as amended of the day, should the 
results thereof be less favourable than those as existed at the date 
of the 1977 amendments and they will not be effective. Clearly 
an obligation of SOEKOR includes and obligation to pay tax. 
Clause 23.3 defines what the direct capital development cost 
would be and would seem to have been included in order to be 
used specifically for the purposes of being able to calculate the 
special levies referred to in 23.2 above. 
Clause 23.5 which requires SOEKOR to maintain a permanent 
establishment in the Republic so as to ensure that all profits arising 
from the Mining Lease are attributable to that establishment is 
clearly directed at ensuring that SOEKOR does· not structure itself 
in such a way that it could be argued that the profits were sourced 
outside of South Africa. If such were the case then that income 
would not be subject to tax by virtue of it not· falling into the c • · 
definition of "gross income" of the Tax Act which requires inter-
alia that the amount received in order for it to fall within the 
definition of "gross income" must have originated from a "source 
within or deemed to be within the Republic." 
One would have thought that this provision would be unnecessary 
in the light of Rhodesian Metals Limited (in liquidation) versus C 0 
T 1938 AD 282, as it would be very hard for SOEKOR to create a 
set of facts such that it could argue that the originating cause was 
something other than the mine itself. However, the Minister of 
Mines was probably being cautious and wanted to establish 
certainty that income would be regarded as falling within "gross 
income" by virtue of this provision. 
Clause 23.6 is that clause which endeavours to limit the taxes-
payable to the State to that sum which is specified in the lease. 
However, if one looks at the wording of this clause it would seem 
that certain taxes could be argued not to fall within the ambit of 
this clause and therefore do not rank for exemption. 
The reason for the statement that not all taxes are caught by these 
provisions is that it could be argued that VAT is not "a tax or levy 
' 
of a similar nature, " nor is it . "a profit on turnover" - as per 
23.6.1. 
It is recommended that as it is a desirable feature of leases of this 
kind to bring clarity to the liabilities of the investor that this 
uncertainty be eradicated by way of an appropriate amendment to 
the lease. 
Paragraph 23. 7, is a capping provision in that the deductions from 
income although required to be those as laid down in the Income 
Tax Act have the proviso that "such deductions shall not be less 
favourable than those allowed under the Income Tax Act, as at the 
date on which the 1977 amendments thereto were promulgated ... " 
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As we have seen, Clause 23.1 refers to SOEKOR's liability for 
income tax payment to the State on their annual taxable income 
derived from the mining of natural oil in accordance with the 
Income Tax Act. 
The provisions of this clause must be considered in relation to 
section 36 (7E) and section 36 (7F). Section 36 (7E) was 
introduced by way of section 25 (C) Income Tax Act 1983 
effective as from the commencement of years of assessment 
ending on or after the 1 January 1984 and Section 36 (7F) was 
inserted by Section 6 ( 1) of the Income Tax Act 1985 effective as 
from the commencement of years of assessment ended on or 
after 5 December 1 984. 
Section 36(7E) of the Act restricts any deduction available by 
reference to mining capital expenditure to mining income, any 
capital expenditure in access of that income being carried forward 
and deemed incurred in the following year. It is important to note 
that this deduction is limited to mining income and may not be 
offset against any other tax base that a taxpayer may have. In the 
absence of OP26 if SOEKOR were to make available mining income 
base then the provisions of Section 36 (7F) would still ring fence 
the capital expenditure. Section 36 (7F) has the effect that the 
expenditure in excess of income from a particular mine cannot be 
offset against any other income including any other mining income 
but must be carried forward and deemed to be capital expenditure 
and incurred by that mine in the future year or years. 
As can be seen from the date that each of these subsections were 
introduced they were not in effect on the date 1977 amendments 
to the Income Tax Act were promulgated. The application of 
Clause 23. 7 has the effect of removing the ring fencing applied by 
Sections 36 (7E) and 36 (7F) so that SOEKOR and or any party 
mining in terms of this lease will be able to offset mining capex in 
excess of its mining income against its other income. 
I would argue that the amendments introduced in 1 983 result in a 
lesser deduction against mining income than ... before. 1983. 
Accordingly Section 38.6 (7E) and 36 (7F) produce a less 
favourable result and would therefore not apply. In essence, 
therefore, the ring fencing provided by those two sections would 
not be applicable in terms of this lease. · - · ,_ ., 
This is a tremendous advantage to SOEKOR and or Mossgas (and 
or any co-venturer). 
If one looks at the Mossgas situation for one moment which has 
spent approximately R7 billion on building a refinery to process the. 
natural oil derived from the offshore mine then it would be able to 
offset the capital expenditure of the mining against the income 
derived from the mining and manufacturing activities. 
It has been assumed that any joint venturer with SOEKOR would 
have access not only to the industrial capex as: well as· the, mining; 1 " , , ! 
capex and further would be able to use mining , as well as non-
mining income base. Mossgas will by virtue of its onshore refinery 
being a process of manufacture also enjoy the deductions allowed 
in terms of Section 1 2 of the Act. If one considers the size of the 
project the amount of tax base that could be tc1ken out of the 
Commissioner pockets may be of r~al concern. However, it 
appears that the Mossgas venture does not have the potential 
profits to entice a private participant to participate notwithstanding 
those tax allowances. 
The rest of Clause 23 really defines capital expenditure ranking for 
redemption and goes beyond Section 36 of the Income Tax 1962 
in certain respects. 
Clause 23.8 promotes the deduction from income of expenditure 
that may have been disallowed by virtue of it having been incurred 
outside South Africa. 
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This clause may have been of more relevance when Section 11 
(b) allowed the deduction of expenditure incurred outside the 
Republic only at the discretion of the Commissioner of Taxes. This 
latter requirement has since fallen away. 
Section 23.10 provides for a permanent rebate of 50% of so much 
of the annual tax payable in respect of the taxable income relating 
to the lease area in the event of SOEKOR making a first discovery 
of natural oil. Provision is made for one such discovery in 
respective waters of up to 200m in depth and two such 
discoveries in respect of waters of more than 200m in depth. 
(This rebate has no equivalent in the Tax Act). 
Clause 23.11 provides for a reduction of the amount of tax 
payable in terms of this Clause 23, should the Minister of 
Economic Affairs and Technology in consultation with the Minister 
of Finance so determine. (A similar provision is found in the Tax 
Act - Section 5 (2A) (b)). 
Having such a clause is always advisable as it empowers the 
respective Ministers to make amendments in order to take into 
account the exigencies at any given time. 
Clause 23.14 is interesting but probably take$ cognisance of the 
fact that SOEKOR as a parastatal may be capable of being 
exempted from tax. 
One further clause in the lease which has an important application 
on the fiscal provisions is that contained in Clause 30, which reads 
as follows 
"the Minister by his execution of this Mining Lease hereby 
approves and adopts the terms and conditions thereof on behalf 
of the State of the Republic of South Africa and undertakes on 
behalf of the State of Republic of South Africa and the Minister 
to do and perform all acts and things which are or maybe 
required to be done or performed to give full effect to this 
mining lease in accordance with its provisions terms and 
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conditions and guarantees that the rights and obligations 
especially created hereby shall not be altered without the 
consent of SOEKOR." - , . - . ·. -
Clearly, therefore, before any changes can be effected SOEKOR 
consent will be required and one cannot envisage a situation of 
greater liabilities being accepted by SOEKOR. This is an 
example of further protection being afforded the investor. 
CONCLUSION 
It would seem that in many respects that the prospecting lease 
(OP26) and the concomitant Mining Lease go a long way to providing 
an investor with the degree of certainty as to the fiscal terms that one 
would expect in contracts of this nature. It has the desirable features 
of flexibility in changing circumstances and always to the benefit of 
the investor. Bearing in mind that the prospectivity of South African 
waters arn doubtful every reasonable aspect which encourages 
participation to explore for oil should be considered and where 
possible implemented. However, from what has been stated above 
there are certain areas which require clarification and or amendment 
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